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Deregulation and Regulatory Reform during the 1980s 
According to political and journalistic rhetoric, the United States relies on a 
market economy to allocate economic resources. Thus, the forces of  supply 
and demand, largely unfettered by  government intervention, are regarded as 
determining the quantities, qualities, and prices of goods and services that are 
produced in the domestic economy. The roots of this belief probably lie in two 
distinctive features of  the US.  economy: (i) the extent of private ownership 
of  capital combined with relatively little public (nationalized) enterprise and 
(ii) the absence of  strong, centralized economic planning. Nonetheless, this 
common belief is largely a myth. 
Through civil law and regulation, federal, state, and local governments have 
a substantial effect on almost all industries. Civil law limits property rights, 
defines contractual obligations, and sets quality standards for goods and ser- 
vices through tort law. Regulatory policy takes two general forms. “Economic” 
regulation controls profits, sets prices, and determines who can participate in 
a market or use a particular resource. “Social” regulation controls polluting 
by-products of  production, sets health and safety standards for products and 
workplaces, restricts the content of  information provided by  sellers through 
advertising and other means of describing products to consumers, and estab- 
lishes requirements to protect buyers from fraudulent, discriminatory, or in- 
competent behavior by  sellers. All these policies profoundly affect prices, 
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costs, product quality, the dynamics of business competition, and the allocation 
of resources in the economy. 
From approximately 1970 through 1990,’ federal regulatory policy in the 
United States experienced profound and far-reaching change. The period is 
defined by the passage of perhaps the two most economically significant regu- 
latory statutes in the nation’s history: the Clean Air Acts of  1970 and 1990. 
The 1970 act was quickly followed by a five-year succession of bills regulating 
workplace safety and health, water quality, product safety, the price of oil, the 
environmental effect of all construction projects requiring federal approval or 
expending federal funds, the safety of consumer products, the management of 
employee retirement funds, and the operation of futures markets. The cumula- 
tive effect of these acts was to expand regulation dramatically-a  change in 
policy that is comparable to, or perhaps even exceeds, the regulatory policies 
enacted during the mid- 1930s under the administration of Franklin Roosevelt 
but that was accomplished under the putatively conservative administration of 
Richard Nixon. After a decade of no significant new social regulatory statutes, 
the Clean Air Act of 1990 again substantially expanded environmental regula- 
tion by  enacting strict new policies regarding acid rain, auto emissions, and 
airborne toxics. 
As the ink dried on the expansive environmental, health, and safety regula- 
tory statutes of the 197Os, the scope of economic regulation began to recede. 
Price, profit, and entry controls in transportation, communications, energy, and 
finance were either eliminated or dramatically relaxed. By the early 1980s, 
much of the Roosevelt-era system of economic regulation was gone; however, 
the Nixon-era reforms in social regulation remained largely in place. By the 
late 1980s, considerable experience with relaxed price, profit, and entry con- 
trols had accumulated. The specter of  reregulation loomed over some indus- 
tries. 
The rationales, causes, and consequences of  “microeconomic” regulatory 
interventions have always been the subject of considerable political and intel- 
lectual controversy. The dramatic policy changes of  the period reflect these 
disputes.  This  chapter  examines  the  nature,  causes,  and  consequences  of 
changes in economic regulation during the 1980s. (Kip Viscusi’s essay in this 
volume covers environmental, health, and safety regulation.) 
We begin with a discussion of the economic and political theories of eco- 
nomic regulation. We  then summarize the major changes in economic regu- 
lation  during  this  period.  Finally,  we  offer  our  conclusions  about  which 
economic and political variables appear to be responsible for stimulating eco- 
nomic regulatory change during this period. The industries affected by the reg- 
ulatory reform movement have diverse characteristics, so the fact that changes 
occurred in so many industries at about the same time is almost certainly more 
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than mere coincidence. Yet simple explanations for the question, “Why now?’ 
are elusive. 
6.1  Economic and Political Theories of Price and Entry Regulation 
The task of theories of economic regulation is to explain and predict which 
markets will be regulated and with what effect. Any such theory must deal 
with both the economic and the political spheres of human behavior. Presum- 
ably, the performance of a market generates the desire to change the behavior 
of those who participate in it. The actions that change market interventions are 
taken by  political actors: civil service bureaucrats, political appointees (who 
manage regulatory agencies), Congress and the president (who collaborate on 
regulatory legislation and budgets), and the courts (which interpret statutes 
and determine the legality of regulatory agency decisions). Thus, a theory of 
economic regulation must account for why the events in a market lead to the 
political act of policy change. 
Economics and political science offer several explanations of  changes in 
regulatory policy. Each discipline has a purely normative or “public interest” 
version, which starts with the proposition that regulatory policy is designed to 
advance public welfare. Likewise, the two disciplines contain several “posi- 
tive”  theories (i.e., purely predictive and free of  normative motivation,  al- 
though not free of normative implications). We  will begin with the normative 
theories and then describe the positive ones (for a more complete discussion, 
see No11 [1989]). 
6.1.1  Normative Economic Theory 
The traditional economic “public interest” rationale for price and entry regu- 
lation turns on perceived failures of  unregulated markets to yield reasonably 
competitive behavior  and  performance  in  certain circumstances. Although 
markets can fail if  consumers are poorly informed, historically “natural mo- 
nopoly” or “natural oligopoly” has been the most important rationale for intro- 
ducing price and  entry regulation (Schmalensee 1979). Specifically, when 
production is characterized by significant economies of scale and sunk costs, 
market structure, behavior, and performance may depart significantly from the 
perfectly competitive ideal. Industries with these characteristics will “natu- 
rally” evolve toward monopolies or oligopolies, with adverse efficiency and 
distributional consequences. Dynamically, in the absence of  price and entry 
regulation, industries with these characteristics are said to be characterized by 
at least one of several problems: excessive entry, costly duplication of facilities, 
either monopoly exploitation or unstable prices and “destructive competition,” 
excessive investments to deter competitive entry, and a variety of other perfor- 
mance failures. 
Several distinguished nineteenth- and early twentieth-century economists 
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proved by  having a single firm supply the service and subjecting its prices to 
government regulation (Sharkey 1982,12-28). It was argued that entry restric- 
tions would ensure that the efficiencies associated with economies of  scale 
were achieved and that cost-based price regulation would pass on the effi- 
ciency gains to consumers. 
Since the seminal article by George Stigler (1961), economists have devel- 
oped a comparably rich literature on the performance of  markets in which 
consumers are poorly informed. Even when such markets are structurally  com- 
petitive, some firms may be able to sustain monopoly prices, and firms may be 
inefficiently  small. Normally,  informational requirements are  the  recom- 
mended solution, but complex products with arcane characteristics may  re- 
quire price regulation to prevent monopoly pricing. 
These market failure stories have several flaws as either a normative or a 
positive theory of  regulation. First, once any significant degree of informa- 
tional imperfection or economies of  scale and sunk costs is incorporated in 
market models, market outcomes will depart from the perfectly competitive 
ideal. But these models provide no clear way to identify industries where, in 
the absence of  regulation, industry performance will be sufficiently poor to 
justify price and entry controls. Because most real markets are in some way 
imperfectly competitive,  the market failure approach can provide a rationaliza- 
tion for regulating almost any industry, if one assumes that regulation can in 
fact ameliorate market imperfections costlessly. 
Second, price and entry regulation is also imperfect. Regulators can be im- 
perfectly informed only about the “efficient costs” and the “optimal” prices of 
services. Price and  entry regulation can increase costs, retard productivity 
growth, and promote cross-subsidization, harming at least some consumers. 
Furthermore,  regulatory procedures aimed at identifying the right costs, setting 
the right prices, and determining the optimal number of firms create incentives 
to produce inefficiently and may discourage or distort technological changes 
that would benefit consumers. As a result, from a normative perspective, deci- 
sions regarding the nature and extent of government regulation should balance 
the costs of imperfect competition against the costs of imperfect regulation. 
Third, even when imperfect regulation is less costly than imperfect competi- 
tion, subsequent changes in supply and demand conditions may lead to a dif- 
ferent conclusion. Sensible regulation today does not necessarily mean that 
regulation and prevailing industry structures should be cemented in place for 
all time. In most cases, regulatory statutes do not ask regulators to identify 
only markets that are substantially imperfectly competitive and to regulate 
them only temporarily until competition can be relied on. Instead, statutes nor- 
mally presume a permanent state of  comprehensive regulation. Significant 
deregulation, therefore, normally requires a new law if it is to escape judicial 
reversal. 
Finally, market failure rationales do not explain the incidence, persistence, 
or nature of  economic regulation in many  industries.  One would  be  hard 371  Economic Regulation 
pressed to support an efficiency argument for price regulation of  trucking, 
buses, airlines, propertykasualty insurance, or natural gas wells. Moreover, 
regulatory procedures and outcomes typically are not consistent with the no- 
tion that the purpose of the regulatory process is to simulate hypothetical com- 
petitive market outcomes. Rather than protecting consumers generally from 
exploitation, government regulation often protects incumbent producers from 
competition and is used to redistribute income from one group of customers 
to another (Stigler 1971; Posner 1971). 
The failure of normative economic theory to explain regulatory policy has 
given rise to several theories of the politics of regulation. Some assign a role 
to economic efficiency effects, but others ignore them entirely. Here we review 
some of the more influential of these theories. 
6.1.2  Ideological Shift 
It has become common, especially in the popular press, to refer broadly to 
the changes in economic regulation as deregulation, which is then held to be 
synonymous with a kind of  libertarian ideology, “to get government off the 
backs of the people.” These changes are often attributed to the Reagan admin- 
istration, the implication being that they were a consequence primarily of an 
ideological shift in the executive branch of the federal government. In a sense, 
this is a political “public interest” account. Citizens changed their views about 
the role of  government, adopting a more conservative, free market ideology 
and in  1980 elected a president to carry out the implied policy change. This 
view is at best simplistic and more likely simply wrong. 
The changes in economic regulation in  the recent past include some ex- 
amples of  virtually complete deregulation of prices, entry, and the quality of 
service (e.g., airlines, trucking, railroads). But other changes have taken the 
form of a peculiar mixture of regulation and competition (eg,  telecommunica- 
tions and natural gas production and transportation) or of preliminary steps to 
encourage competition on the fringes of the market and in vertically or hori- 
zontally associated industry (e.g., electric power). In only one case was a regu- 
latory agency eliminated (airlines); in all cases (even airlines) the industry is 
still regulated in some way, although typically according to different criteria 
from those used prior to the late 1970s.  Resources devoted to economic regula- 
tion  by  the  federal  government have  declined  in  some  areas  (primarily 
transportation) but have been relatively stable or increased in others, as shown 
in table 6.1. 
Many of  the changes in economic regulation were launched prior to the 
Reagan administration. Moreover, the causes of these changes reflect the ac- 
tions of regulators, legislators, judges, and presidents of both parties and all 
ideological types in both federal and state government. Thus, these changes 
simply do not reflect a sudden ideological change in federal executive branch 
views about the strengths and weaknesses of price and entry regulation gener- 
ally. Indeed, many of the most significant changes in economic regulation be- 372  Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. No11 
Table 6.1 
Agency  1970  1980  1985  1990 
Staffing of Selected Regulatory Agencies (full-time equivalents) 
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Source: Warren and Chilton (1990). 
gan during the Carter administration and were initiated by liberal Democrats 
appointed by Carter to economic regulatory agencies. Moreover, Carter’s prin- 
cipal rival for the presidency within the Democratic party was Senator Edward 
Kennedy of Massachusetts, whose advocacy of airline deregulation in the mid- 
1970s is regarded as an important milestone in achieving reforms in economic 
regulation. Thus, it is not particularly productive to refer to a generic deregulu- 
tion movement or to think of  it primarily as a consequence of the election of 
Ronald Reagan. The causes are far broader than ideology or party and far more 
pragmatic and complex than a simple desire to reduce the scope of  govern- 
ment. An important implication of this fact is that Ronald Reagan’s departure 
from the presidency per se is not likely to cause these reforms to be rescinded. 
6.1.3  Ideas and Garbage Cans 
A second political explanation having far more impressive scholarly creden- 
tials attributes causal influence to the way the intellectual establishment thinks 
about government policy. Although a political account, the “ideas theory” as- 
signs only a minor role to electoral politics. Elections simply force political 
officials to take visible actions to solve salient national problems. Unlike in the 
“ideology theory,” the electorate is not assumed to care very much about ex- 
actly how the problem is solved or what political philosophy the solution re- 
flects. Instead, it wants actions and, later, visible improvements. 
The role of the intellectual elite-academics,  scholars at think tanks, and 
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odicals-is  to provide explanations and solutions for what is wrong. In the 
case of economic regulation, the specific contribution of intellectual gadflies 
was scholarly and popular literature that found regulated industries to be inef- 
ficient and protective of certain special interests. With a few important excep- 
tions, the source of this new perception about economic regulation was econo- 
mists, who,  from about  1960 until  about  1975, produced the  first serious 
empirical and theoretical studies examining what regulation actually does, as 
opposed to what normative economic theory says it ought to do. Nonetheless, 
it is not economists who have attributed much importance to this literature in 
actually causing policy change but political scientists (Derthick and Quirk 
1985) and lawyers (Breyer 1982; Levine 1981). 
The causal link between the intellectual elite and political action can take 
two forms: pure ideas or garbage cans. The pure ideas theory is essentially 
congruent to the normative economic theory of regulation. It argues that some- 
how political actors were unaware of the extent to which economic regulation 
had drifted from the norm of protecting consumers against market imperfec- 
tions. Hence, once political actors came to believe that the economics literature 
was correct, they responded by changing policy. This version of the ideas story 
has basically the same infirmity as the normative economic theory, in that it 
either fails to explain much of regulation at the time regulatory statutes were 
passed or assumes substantial ignorance on the part of the political officials 
who enacted these statutes. Moreover, if the real point of regulation is to cure 
market failures in the interests of consumers, why did it take so long to change 
statutes that were patently inconsistent with this objective? The theory leaves 
unexplained the very long gap between the publication of  the research findings 
and the actual reform of policy. Richard Caves’s (1962) critical study of airline 
regulation and the similar study by John Meyer et al. (1959) of truck and rail 
regulation predated significant deregulation of these industries by more than 
fifteen years. Indeed, in  1936, in the midst of the era when many economic 
regulatory statutes were being passed, Pendleton Herring, one of the most dis- 
tinguished political scientists of his generation, observed that, in the regulatory 
process, “the milieu is distinctly one of special interest” (1936, 183). 
The “garbage can” version  of  the causal link between ideas and policy 
change is borrowed from a theory proposed by Michael Cohen, James March, 
and Johan Olson (1972) as a way to understand all nonmarket organizations. 
The premise is‘ that  leaders of  these organizations are unlikely to be  very 
skilled at understanding the causes of substantial changes in their organiza- 
tional environment because, most of the time, they are supposed to be manag- 
ing a relatively stable, even inflexible, institution. More specifically, elected 
officials are unlikely to know much about the effects of economic regulation 
or, for that matter, about the consequences of  any other relatively technical 
policy-or  about the causes of a new social problem. Thus, most of the time 
elected officials are not thinking seriously about any given policy, and agency 
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When an external shock occurs, government officials seek a solution but are 
uncertain about how to identify it. Meanwhile, back at the think tank, intellec- 
tuals have been creating a variety of new ideas about all significant policies or 
social problems. The garbage can is a metaphor for the variety of idea products 
that are available should political actors need them. In the case at hand, the 
garbage can called economic policy was filled with research findings concern- 
ing the operation of  the domestic economy, but one especially large and im- 
pressive piece of garbage was the work on economic regulation. The instigat- 
ing events were the economic stagflation of  the 1970s or economic shocks 
particular to specific industries. The initial response was traditional remedies 
(fiscal and monetary stimulation and price controls), but, when these did not 
work, political leaders dipped into the garbage can. They found that economic 
regulation was causing inefficiency in basic infrastructural industries, so they 
asked some producers of the garbage to reform the system. The fact that eco- 
nomic regulation could not possibly have been the cause of stagflation was in a 
sense beside the point: it was time to take actions that would improve economic 
efficiency, and the relevant experts were virtually united in predicting that re- 
forming economic regulation would have this effect. 
The obvious criticism of the garbage can model is that economists’ views 
about microeconomic policy  generally  (agriculture, energy, trade, medical 
care, etc.) usually involve a proposal for greater liberalization,  yet only in eco- 
nomic regulation-not  even in social regulation-were  the economists’ pre- 
scriptions seriously considered. The theory has a response to this criticism: 
other ideas were pulled out of  the garbage can when crises emerged in the 
trade deficit, agriculture, energy, and the environment. But this explanation is 
not very satisfying, even if true, because it implies an irrational unpredictabil- 
ity to policy change. Indeed, the explanation is tautological, for any policy 
change must have been somebody’s idea and so confirms the theory. It also 
implies that political decision makers are incapable of learning from past expe- 
rience by generalizing from successes and failures, even if initially the selec- 
tion of policies was random. 
Nonetheless, we cannot deny that, had the research about economic regula- 
tion reached more benign conclusions, the history of policy change would have 
been different. Nor can we escape the fact that many contributors to the schol- 
arly literature on economic regulation went on to serve in regulatory agencies 
and were in positions to provide the stimulus for regulatory reform. 
6.1.4  Interest Group Bias 
The predominant positive (nonnormative) theory of regulation is based on 
the dominance of organized special interests in the political process. The focal 
point of the theory is factors that cause citizens to become mobilized to try to 
influence public policy. The theory assumes that politicians are motivated to 
win reelection and in order to do so adopt policies that either will cause their 
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problem for a politician is that a voter is virtually powerless and so has little 
incentive to vote or even to know what policies an official advocates (Downs 
1957). But groups of citizens are organized for various nonpolitical purposes, 
notably into firms, trade associations, labor unions, and other groupings ac- 
cording to economic interests (Olson 1965; Moe 1980). Economic groupings 
can easily and cheaply form the basis for bargaining with politicians for favor- 
able public policies in return for political support. Because a person’s income 
is a very important part of life, and because government has a substantial effect 
on the distribution of  income, economic organizations have an incentive to 
participate in politics. Moreover, when organized as economic interest groups, 
citizens are no longer powerless because their votes and contributions can be- 
come a significant factor in an election. Of course, economic interest groups 
are not the only organizations that might be influential; other institutions such 
as churches, avocational affinity groups (e.g., the Sierra Club or Ducks Unlim- 
ited), and state and local government are also potential parties to political bar- 
gains with politicians. 
The interest group theory predicts that economic regulation is instituted in 
response to demands among organized interests for changes in market rules 
that will confer economic benefits on them, at the expense of the groups that 
are affected by the market rules but that are not sufficiently well organized to 
have a countervailing influence on policy (Stigler 1971; and Peltzman 1976). 
Thus, economic regulation should benefit the regulated industry (both profits 
and employment conditions for unionized labor), the supplier industries, and 
certain groups of  customers who are organized according to their economic 
interests, at the expense of suppliers (e.g., nonunion labor) and customers (e.g., 
the prototypical consumer), who are not well organized. 
Interest group theory has several predictions about the nature of regulation. 
First, it predicts cross-subsidies  among regulated services and products, gener- 
ally working to favor organized customers at the expense of unorganized ones. 
Second, relatively competitive industries offer greater opportunities for the 
creation and redistribution of  rents than do monopolies. In the former case, 
regulation can retard entry and enforce collusive prices, creating greater profits 
for incumbent firms. It can also dissipate some of these profits by setting highly 
favorable prices for organized consumer groups. Monopoly regulation, then, 
should be rare, arising only when the monopolist is not natural and therefore 
faces the prospect of competitive entry or when regulation is demanded by 
organized buyer and/or supplier interests that seek to restrain the power of 
the monopoly. The latter case differs from the normative economic account, 
however, because it does not predict that  ordinary consumers will benefit 
from regulation. 
According to the theory, the causes of  deregulation are factors that make 
regulation sufficiently less beneficial to some organized interests that, consid- 
ering the costs of participating in the regulatoly and political processes, these 
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1989). For example, if the demand for regulated services becomes more elas- 
tic, there is less monopoly rent to extract and so less net benefit to confer on 
organized interests. Alternatively, owing to change in technology, supplier or 
buyer groups may  prefer to become vertically integrated rather than to buy 
regulated services but are prevented from doing so by regulatory entry barriers. 
Or, owing to changes in income and the pattern of demand, all participants in 
the regulated market may become organized, leaving no remaining source of 
benefits to be distributed among the organized interests. Then costly regulation 
will generate no compensating benefits to organized groups, and they will fa- 
vor eliminating it. Finally, again owing to changes in technology or demand, 
an industry that once feared entry may have become a natural monopoly. If so, 
regulation is no longer necessary to sustain monopoly profits and so will no 
longer be favored by the incumbent firm. Thus, if economic regulatory reform 
is largely consistent with interest group theory, some quite explicit facts ought 
to be observable about who supported and opposed deregulation and who ben- 
efited and who lost when liberalization took place. 
There are reasons to doubt that interest group theory is a complete explana- 
tion for changes in economic policy. Most apparently, a great deal of political 
participation is not accounted for by the activities of organized interests. De- 
spite the obvious and growing importance of  political action committees in 
campaign finance, which quite likely does reflect organized special interests, 
the majority of campaign contributions still come from individuals. Likewise, 
campaign volunteers are primarily highly motivated individuals,  not organized 
groups. In addition, economic special interest is hardly the motivation behind 
numerous political organizations, ranging from the League of Women Voters 
to grass-roots organizations within political parties. Thus, at least some citi- 
zens seem to care about policy in ways other than economic self-interest and 
are  not  dissuaded from active political participation by  individual power- 
lessness. It remains to be seen, however, if any of these influences play a sub- 
stantial role in economic regulatory reform. 
6.1.5  Political Entrepreneurship 
The theory of political entrepreneurs focuses on candidates for office, rather 
than interest groups, as the vehicle for organizing citizens to participate in the 
political system. If an unorganized group of citizens is harmed by a policy, the 
politician can provide resources to motivate the group to express its policy 
choices in the political process. Political candidates, and especially incumbent 
politicians, command considerable resources for communicating with constit- 
uents and, in addition, receive free publicity in the mass media. If politicians 
can package a message in an attractive and comprehensible way and thereby 
convince some unorganized voters that a policy is harmful, they may succeed 
in obtaining additional political support. 
Unfortunately, the theory of political entrepreneurship does not predict ex- 
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Indeed, the primary prediction is unpredictability. The theory of majority-rule 
democracy, beginning with the seminal work of  Kenneth Arrow  (1  95 1) and 
culminating in the depressing results of  Linda Cohen and Steven Matthews 
(1980),  states that, in general, a series of majority-rule votes can produce liter- 
ally any technically feasible policy. Whatever existing policy is, another policy 
can obtain majority-rule support. Indeed, no matter what today’s policy is, a 
sequence of majority-rule votes can produce any other policy. Thus, a political 
entrepreneur can select from among a very large number of strategies for de- 
feating the status quo. Consequently, the targets of the entrepreneurial skills of 
a politician are predictable, if at all, only from the personal policy preferences 
of the politician and the relative costs of organizing different opposing coali- 
tions. 
In contrast to the organization of economic interests, political entrepreneur- 
ship does not leave unorganized consumers (or nonunion labor) without effec- 
tive representation. In the case of economic regulation, the political entrepre- 
neur theory is consistent with (if it does not predict) a populist base for the 
regulatory reform movement.2 One might observe deregulation being led by 
self-appointed spokespersons for consumers who suffer the costs of a regula- 
tory policy that has been captured by organized economic interests. Moreover, 
the political entrepreneurship  theory is also consistent with unstable regulatory 
policy, alternating between protecting organized interests and the pursuit of 
economic efficiency, since either policy, with the right twist, can defeat the 
other when the other is the status quo. 
A major criticism of this line of theorizing is that it is flatly contradicted by 
the stability of policy. After all, economic regulation was in place for decades 
before it was liberalized. The answer to this critique is that, knowing that ma- 
jority rule is unstable, politicians build in institutional impediments to change 
in order to make policy unresponsive to the kinds of attacks described above. 
The idea, called structure-induced equilibrium, is that agencies and Congress 
are organized to give each partner in  a winning coalition a veto over future 
policy changes (Shepsle and Weingast 1981). Thus, a policy can change only 
if  a member of its enacting coalition ceases to be represented in Congress or 
before an agzncy that was  created to be responsive to its interests or if  it 
changes policy preferences in ways that other coalition members would ap- 
prove. Thus, organizing a new interest in economic regulatory policy will not 
produce policy change unless circumstances have changed so that the new or- 
ganization can avoid some veto points. 
In Congress, the veto points are created by committee rights. All legislation 
is referred to committees, which are responsible for particular policy domains. 
Usually a bill will not be passed until its relevant committee has approved it; 
however, this process can be circumvented  by referral to another committee or 
2. For an interpretation of the  rise of political opposition to slavery as an example of political 
entrepreneurship, see Riker (1982, chaps. 8, 9). 378  Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. No11 
by  a discharge petition to force the issue to the entire legislative body. In eco- 
nomic regulation, the relevant committees are often the House and Senate 
Commerce Committees. One form that destabilizing  political entrepreneurship 
could take is to bypass Commerce or so threaten to bypass it that the committee 
reports a bill that it does not favor but prefers to what might emerge if it were 
bypassed. These alternatives are, however, costly. They require that Congress 
ignore committee specialization,  which diminishes the incentive of specialized 
committees to be expert in a particular area of policy. Similarly, if one commit- 
tee bypasses another, it can be subject to retaliation. Because members of Con- 
gress typically are assigned to committees on the basis of their expressed pref- 
erences, bypassing another committee generally means risking a position of 
greater value in order to influence a policy of lesser value. Consequently, by- 
passing a committee ought to be rare and ought to occur only when there is a 
relatively high level of  dissatisfaction with a policy. Likewise, no politician 
would have an incentive to organize a new group to attack a policy unless these 
conditions were satisfied. Hence, one would expect a “political entrepreneur- 
ship” model to explain regulatory reform only if the level of public discontent 
with regulatory policy was quite high. 
6.1.6  Function of the Theories 
The principal purpose in summarizing  the main theories of regulatory policy 
is to structure our review of how change took place and what consequences 
flowed from it. Together these theories tell us where to look for political sup- 
port for liberalization of economic regulation and alternative  predictions about 
how liberalization should have  affected prices, costs, and service quality in 
regulated sectors. With these ideas in mind, we now turn to a description of 
the origins and effects of the changes in economic regulation. 
6.2  Overview of Economic Regulation and Its Reform 
Virtually every sector of the economy that was subject to economic regula- 
tion before 1975 has experienced very significant changes in the nature and 
extent of  regulation. These changes have had significant effects on industry 
structures, price levels and structures, costs, and productivity. The industries in 
which changes in economic regulation occurred are airlines, trucking, buses, 
railroads, telecommunications,  natural gas production and transmission, cable 
television, banking and financial services, electric power, and property and 
liability insurance. These industries vary widely in structure, performance, the 
nature of regulation, and the distribution of regulatory responsibilities  between 
federal and state authorities. There are also wide variations in the rationales, 
causes, and consequences of regulatory change across these industries. Table 
6.2 provides some general information about the major industries affected by 
changes in  economic regulation. A  necessarily brief  review  of  regulatory 
changes that took place in the airline, trucking, telecommunications,  insurance, Table 6.2  Deregulation and Regulatory Reform during the 1980s 
Industry 
Prirnaq Regulatory 
.4gencies  Regulatory Changes  Source of Regulatory Change 




4.  Telephones 
5.  Natural gas 
6.  Electric powcr 
7. Propcrty/liability 
8. Cable television 
insurance 
9. Sanking 
ICC, statc agcncics 
TCC: 
FCC, stage agencies 
FERC, state agencies 
FERC,  swtc agcncics 
Statc agcncics 
Municipalities, FCC 
FSLIC, FDK,  Comptroller of 
the Currency. Federal 
Reserve 
Deregulation of  prices and 
Price flexibility, ease of exit, 
eotry 
mergers 
Industry restructuring, price 
flexibility, ease entry, 
incentives regulation 
deregulation of field 
prices, contractural 
revisions 
Unbundling of gas supplies, 
Entry into wholesale 
generation, competition in 
wholesale power, 
pmurement policies 
More price regulation 
Deregulation of prices 
Partial dereplation of 
investment portfolios, 
deposits services, and 
interest rates 
a)  CAR  initiatives 
h) Airline Deregulation Act of 1980 
c) Antitrust enforcement 
a) ICC initiatives 
h)  Motor Camer Act uf 1980 
u)  ICC initiatives 
b) 4R Act of  1976 
c) Staggers  Rail Act of  lYS0 
d) Economic and competitive pressures 
a)  Agency initiatives 
b)  Federal antitrust case 
c) Competitive pressures 
a)  Natural Gas Policy Act of  1978 
b)  Fuel Use Act of 1978 
c) Exogenous shocks 
d)  FERC Initiatives 
e)  State commission initiatives 
a) Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act  01 1978 
b)  Regulatory-induced economic prcssures 
c)  Competitive pressures 
d)  Environmental pressures 
a) State legislativdregulatory  initiatives 
a)  Cable Television Act of  1984 
b) FCC initiatives 
a)  Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 
b) Gam-St.  Germain Depository Act of  1982 
c) Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
1980 
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banking, and natural gas industries demonstrates  just how diverse are the ratio- 
nales, causes, and consequences associated with these changes. 
6.2.1  Airlines and Trucking 
The airline and trucking industries are the classic cases of virtually complete 
deregulation of  prices and entry. (The airline industry is discussed in more 
detail below.) Until about 1977, airline prices and route structures were heavily 
regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), and interstate trucking was 
similarly regulated by  the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) (Joskow 
and Rose 1989, 1469-73). Frequently, competing suppliers were certificated 
to provide service on particular routes, but price competition was largely pre- 
cluded by  price regulation based on industry-wide average costs. Scholarly 
research on regulation in these industries performed in the 1960s and early 
1970s concluded that regulation increased costs and prices, distorted techno- 
logical change, led to excessive service quality as a consequence of nonprice 
competition in  conjunction with excessive prices,  and  involved  significant 
cross-subsidization  among classes of customers (Joskow and No11  1981,4-10; 
Joskow and Rose 1989, 1469-73,  1480-86). Furthermore, research suggested 
that these industries did not have pervasive market failures, were or could be 
structurally competitive, and, absent regulatory constraints, would behave and 
perform at least as well as many industries that are not subject to price and 
entry regulation. 
The origin and persistence of  economic regulation in these industries was 
widely attributed by students of regulation to serving special interests. Incum- 
bent firms were protected from competition. Organized labor could make use 
of protective regulation to prevent competition from new nonunionized suppli- 
ers and to achieve supracompetitive wages and attractive work rules. Some 
consumer groups obtained subsidies through their political influence over the 
regulatory process. 
Most economists viewed complete deregulation of prices and entry, along 
with the application of conventional antitrust sanctions, as desirable from an 
efficiency perspective (Joskow and No11  1981, 4-10).  Nevertheless, econo- 
mists also believed that, because of  the substantial financial stake of  well- 
organized interests in the status quo and the diffuse nature of the costs imposed 
on many consumers by deregulation, neither industry was a likely candidate 
for deregulation (Kahn 1983). Nevertheless, regulators appointed to the CAB 
and the ICC during the Carter administration moved aggressively to use ex- 
isting statutory authority to relax price and entry regulation substantially (Bai- 
ley, Graham, and Kaplan 1985; Kahn  1979; Keeler 1983). Congress subse- 
quently enacted statutes that clarified the legality of the efforts of the CAB and 
the ICC to relax or remove price and entry regulation and encouraged these 
agencies to proceed with deregulation  initiatives. The Airline Deregulation Act 
of  1978 established statutory transition arrangements that eventually led to 
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Motor Carrier Act of 1980 gave the ICC clear statutory authority to relax price 
and entry restrictions and to encourage competition in trucking, although the 
ICC retained authority to regulate prices and entry under a public interest stan- 
dard that is more consistent with promoting competition than protecting in- 
cumbent competitors. 
The deregulation initiatives in airlines and trucking were not part of a gen- 
eral ideological package that promoted less government regulation and more 
reliance on unregulated markets. They took place during a period of rapid in- 
flation and instability in world energy markets and were promoted as compo- 
nents of a whip-inflation strategy. Deregulation was opposed by the industries 
subject to regulation and by organized labor. The initial regulatory initiatives 
came about through the appointment of CAB and ICC commissioners already 
oriented toward deregulation and the use of the administrative process to relax 
price and entry regulation. Administrative deregulation was followed quickly 
by legislation that not only provided clear statutory authority for more flexible 
pricing and entry rules but clearly articulated a congressional preference for 
less regulation and more competition. The major actors at the regulatory agen- 
cies in the Carter administration viewed deregulation as being desirable be- 
cause the specijic  economic characteristics of  these markets made effective 
competition a likely outcome. They believed that price and entry regulation 
not only was unnecessq but was the cause of  demonstrably worse perfor- 
mance than under competition. The fact that both airlines and trucking were 
largely regulated by federal agencies, with little state involvement in price and 
entry regulation (more for trucking), also meant that deregulation could pro- 
ceed as a national initiative without requiring fifty states to implement comple- 
mentary policies. 
Airline and trucking regulation differed considerably in the years before de- 
regulation. The changes in the late 1970s at the ICC were cataclysmic, in that 
the agency had clung tenaciously to the need for detailed, heavy-handed regu- 
lation of trucking until the very end. The Carter appointees truly revolutionized 
the agency. At the CAB, change was somewhat more evolutionary. In the early 
1970s, the agency tried to reform pricing rules within the context of continued 
economic regulation in a major rule-making proceeding, the Domestic Passen- 
ger Fare Inquiry (DPFI). The DPFI tried to bring fares more in line with costs 
and allowed some off-peak fares to go into effect (Breyer 1982,211-12). How- 
ever, between  1970 and  1974, the CAB administered a “route moratorium” 
under which it refused to hear applications even by existing airlines to serve 
new routes. It also encouraged airlines to make agreements to limit the number 
of flights on each route (Breyer 1982, 208-9).  Additional price flexibility was 
introduced during the Ford administration by  allowing airlines to engage in a 
variety of  special discounts. In Senate hearings in 1976, the chairman of the 
CAB testified that the Board unanimously supported substantial reduction in 
its control over prices and entry. Although real deregulation did not occur until 
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had already begun some initiatives to liberalize the prevailing rigid system of 
regulation. 
The differences between the ICC and the CAB obviously do not reflect any 
consistent view toward economic regulation in structurally competitive indus- 
tries. The CAB experience predates any conceivable emergence of an ideologi- 
cal deregulation fervor. Sentiment for airline deregulation began to crystalize 
after President Ford asked Congress to establish a National Commission on 
Regulatory Reform in 1974. It was strengthened  by the famous Kennedy hear- 
ings, in which the junior senator from Massachusetts presided over a highly 
critical review of  the agency’s anticompetitive policies (U.S. Senate 1975; 
Breyer 1982).  But, according to Derthick and Quirk (1985), one reason for the 
CAB’S modest reforms in the early 1970s was an effort to respond to the criti- 
cism of  the agency in  the economics literature. Moreover, as described by 
George Douglas and James Miller (1974), who participated in the DPFI, eco- 
nomic analysis played a significant role in shaping the resulting pricing re- 
forms. Why the CAB,  but not the ICC, apparently was influenced by econom- 
ics so early in the game remains a mystery. 
6.2.2  Telecommunications 
While airlines and trucking were regulated primarily by  federal agencies, 
the telephone industry has been subject to pervasive regulation by both federal 
(the Federal Communications  Commission [FCC]  ) and state agencies. In prin- 
cipal, the division between state and federal responsibilities  in telecommunica- 
tions turns on distinctions between intrastate and interstate utilization of  the 
telecommunications  network. This distinction is often rather blurry in practice; 
hence, the division of policy into state and federal issues for purposes of regu- 
lating prices, entry, and the availability of service confronts special problems. 
First, the telecommunications  network is characterized  by joint and common 
costs. Interstate and intrastate calls use the same switching and transmission 
equipment that constitute the local exchange network. As a result, the alloca- 
tion of costs between state and federal jurisdictions is inherently arbitrary and 
creates a natural opportunity for rent-seeking behavior. 
Second, until the 1980s, the telephone industry was dominated by  a single 
vertically and horizontally integrated company (AT&T). As a result, its activi- 
ties spanned all regulatory jurisdictions, and its size, sophistication, and com- 
plexity were enormous compared to the resources of any of its regulators. As 
a result, AT&T was difficult to regulate by any single agency. 
Third, after World War 11,  significant technological changes took place in 
switching, transmission, and customer equipment. These changes caused tele- 
communications technology to converge with microelectronic and computer 
technologies and hence gave firms in these industries potential competitive 
opportunities in  telecommunications. Moreover, technological change also 
worked to reduce the importance of  scale economies in the industry. This 
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somewhat different form of management, could provide better or less costly 
products than were being supplied by AT&T. For the most part, these changes 
had a greater effect on the parts of the industry in the federal  jurisdiction. Until 
about 1980, the slowest progress took place in the lines connecting customers 
to the local switch, which accounts for more than 60 percent of the costs of 
local telephone companies. 
Fourth, state and federal regulators encouraged some entry by setting prices 
to effectuate cross-subsidies.  Some competitive entry may have been attracted, 
not because alternative suppliers could provide service at a lower cost or of a 
better quality than AT&T, but because regulators set some prices too high.3 
Likewise, by pricing other services too low, regulators may have discouraged 
entry where it was warranted. The net effect of the pricing structure was that, 
on balance, federal services subsidized state services. 
Fifth, when reform began, it was widely believed that broad, efficiency- 
enhancing regulatory reform would require more than simple deregulation of 
prices and entry. The local exchange continues to be a state-regulated monop- 
oly, at least for residential and small business customers. In long distance, the 
most plausible permanent market structure is a natural oligopoly, but for at 
least several years it was expected to remain dominated by a single firm, AT& 
T. Hence, at least for a while, complete economic deregulation of long distance 
was implausible, although it may be attractive in the 1990s. Competitive be- 
havior is more likely in other segments of the telephone industry, but, because 
of AT&T's size, a transition period was needed to allow sufficient competitive 
constraints to develop. 
Finally, promoting competition in segments where it can be effective- 
equipment and long-distance services-was  thought by  some to be substan- 
tially inhibited by the vertically integrated structure of the telephone indusw, 
especially one in which a single supplier provided almost all local exchange 
service. According to this view, promoting competition required fundamental 
structural changes in the industry, in part because coordinated state and federal 
regulatory reform of a resistent, vertically integrated monopoly would be slow 
and difficult. 
Because the structural view prevailed, regulatory reform in telecommunica- 
tions was affected by both regulatory initiatives and a federal antitrust suit that 
led to a complete restructuring of the telephone industry in 1984. New entrants 
and customer groups that benefited from these policies became an important 
political force for continuing reform within the regulatory process, the courts, 
and the legislative and executive branches. 
Meanwhile, most state regulatory authorities played a small, sometimes 
3. In  the early days of long-distance competition, specialized common carriers did not pay local 
telephone companies part of their revenues, as did ATBrT.  Eventually, the FCC adopted a compli- 
cated and quite arbitrary pricing system for local access for all carriers. These prices depended on 
the  form of  access enjoyed by  a carrier and  were  lower for AT&T's  competitors because their 
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counterproductive role in regulatory reform efforts in this industry. The single 
most important beneficiaries of cross-subsidy in telecommunications  were ba- 
sic access customers in small towns and rural areas-a  service that is regulated 
by  the  states (No11  and  Smart 1990). Competition threatened these cross- 
subsidies and so threatened to cause state regulators to have to raise these 
highly visible prices. Not surprisingly, most state regulators did not rejoice at 
this prospect and fought liberalization. 
The key point about developments in telecommunications  policy is that it is 
difficult to point to any single decision that introduced competition. More than 
anything else, FCC decisions seem to be driven by  technological progress- 
and by the fact that much of this progress has come from outside the industry, 
from companies willing and able to go head to head against AT&T in some 
market. And, more than other agencies, throughout most of its history the FCC 
has been a relatively reluctant regulator. Unlike in transportation and energy 
regulation, economists had not undertaken extensive empirical studies of tele- 
communications regulation? And, unlike airlines and trucking, regulatory re- 
form in telecommunications  took place without any legislative action. Indeed, 
the primary legislative threat has been to reverse both FCC liberalization and 
the antitrust case. In both  1976 and  1981, AT&T,  with some support from 
executive branch officials who disapproved of events at the FCC and the De- 
partment of Justice, almost succeeded in obtaining legislation to establish in 
law its monopoly status (see Temin and Galombos 1987).  Then, in 1986, Con- 
gress fell only one vote short in the Senate from reversing the FCC’s move 
toward eliminating cross-subsidies in AT&T’s price structure. Although one 
should not read too much into near misses on legislation, it is apparent that 
regulatory reform in telecommunications has been  on far shakier political 
ground than was deregulation of airlines and trucking. 
6.2.3  Natural Gas 
Like telephones, the natural gas industry has been subject to pervasive regu- 
lation by  both federal and state regulators. And, as with telephones, federal 
regulators (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [FERC] and its prede- 
cessor, the Federal Power Commission [FPC]), the courts, and the U.S. Con- 
gress have played the dominant role in changing regulatory policy and industry 
structure. Unlike the telephone industry, natural gas was not extensively inte- 
grated either horizontally or vertically. 
Natural gas is produced by  numerous firms, most of which sell to indepen- 
dent interstate natural gas pipelines. These pipelines sell gas to independent 
distribution utilities, which have de facto exclusive geographic franchises to 
resell gas to residential, commercial, and industrial customers other than large 
industrial and electric utility customers that purchase gas directly from pipe- 
4. Nearly all the research focused on measuring the magnitude of scale economies in the indus- 
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lines. Because of this structure, the costs of  natural gas production, pipeline 
transportation, and retail distribution are readily ~eparable.~ 
Federal regulation encompasses (since 1954) the prices that interstate pipe- 
lines pay for natural gas in the field and the prices that pipelines charge to local 
distribution companies for gas and pipeline transportation (since 1938). State 
regulation covers the prices charged to retail customers by local gas distribu- 
tion utilities. Federal regulators are responsible for certificating the construc- 
tion (entry) of  new natural gas pipelines and the expansion of existing pipe- 
lines, while state regulators are responsible for certificating extensions of local 
gas distribution systems. Of course, since a large fraction of the costs of a local 
distribution company is accounted for by  the costs of  the gas it purchases, 
federal regulation of field prices and pipeline charges has important implica- 
tions for the ultimate prices paid by retail customers. 
Initially, the Federal Power Commission was also a reluctant regulator, re- 
fusing to regulate the field prices of natural gas because the industry was struc- 
turally competitive. But, in  1954, the Supreme Court ruled that the Natural 
Gas Act of  1938 required the agency to regulate the price paid by interstate 
pipelines for gas in the field, despite the fact that a plain reading of the statute 
suggested otherwise. After several years of experimentation with cost of ser- 
vice regulation on  a producer-by-producer basis, the FPC introduced field 
price regulation in the early 1960s, setting separate ceiling prices for “old gas” 
and “new gas” in each of five gas-producing areas on the basis of the average 
historical cost of discovery, development, and extraction in that area. This sys- 
tem of historical average cost pricing could lead to prices that equated supply 
and demand only by accident. Within a decade, field price regulation had pro- 
duced the predictable result: excess demand for gas and prices insensitive to 
trends in substitute fuel prices and their impact on the demand for natural gas 
(MacAvoy 1971, 1973; MacAvoy and Pindyck 1973). The problem was vastly 
exacerbated by the first oil price shock of  1973, causing substantial increases 
in demand at regulated prices, but no opportunities for gas prices to adjust to 
clear the market. Shortages and administrative rationing of natural gas became 
major problems for the industry and its regulators during the 1970s. 
After years of bitter debate, Congress finally passed the Natural Gas Policy 
Act of  1978 (NGPA), surely the most complicated economic regulatory statue 
yet enacted. The basic idea of the statute was to let the price of gas gradually 
rise to market clearing levels and to provide a means whereby higher-cost wells 
could be profitably exploited. The mechanism was an incredibly elaborate 
classification scheme for gas wells, combined with a separate regulatory pric- 
ing procedure for each category. Eventually, as old, cheap wells played out and 
new, expensive wells replaced them, gas prices would increase, and regulatory 
price constraints would no longer be binding. Unfortunately, the price adjust- 
S. The costs of  natural gas production are not readily separable from the  costs of  producing 
oil. however. 386  Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. No11 
ment mechanisms contained in the NGPA were based on specific assumptions 
about the future price of oil, a close substitute for natural gas for many end 
users. Just as the NGPA was passed, oil prices rose sharply as a consequence 
of the Iranian revolution (1979-81). At first it appeared that the gas price tra- 
jectory contained in the NGPA was too low and that gas shortages would con- 
tinue until prices for many categories of gas were to be deregulated in 1985. 
But, after 1981, oil prices began to fall and then collapsed in 1986. The reces- 
sion of  1981-83,  and a restructuring of  the economy that adversely affected 
industries that used large quantities of natural gas, made the situation even 
worse. A gas shortage quickly became a gas glut. 
During the mid- and late 1980s, the combination of historical regulatory 
practices and changed economic conditions caused the natural gas industry to 
plunge into economic turmoil. Before the gas glut, pipelines had signed long- 
term contracts for future gas supplies that anticipated high oil prices and a 
growing demand for natural gas. They had also signed contracts with local 
distribution companies to provide bundled gas and transportation services at 
the average cost of  service. When oil prices fell and the demand for gas de- 
clined, the supplies of gas that pipelines had contracted for could no longer be 
sold to end users at prices that recovered the costs of  these contracts. As a 
result, major changes ensued in federal and state economic regulation and in 
the structure of the industry. 
Three significant changes took place in  the way  gas is sold. Rather than 
being required to purchase bundled gas and transportation services, pipeline 
customers could purchase at least some gas directly from field producers and 
contract with gas pipelines for transportation services only. Thus, many gas 
pipelines now act as common carriers, charging customers only for pipeline 
transportation services that continue to be regulated by the FERC, using tradi- 
tional rate-of-return procedures. Because of the unbundling of gas supplies 
from transportation services, gas pipelines, gas distribution companies, and 
large direct service customers increasingly compete directly for field gas, and 
a large brokering industry has emerged to arrange for gas supplies for local 
distributors and direct service customers who choose not to rely on pipelines 
for bundled gas supplies and transportation services. 
During the late 1980s, gas prices were significantly below the prices that 
would have emerged had the old system of bundled sales and long-term con- 
tracts been retained. Contract prices and quantities negotiated in the late 1970s 
and 1980s generally reflected the expectation that oil prices would continue 
to rise and gas demand to increase. Many of  these contracts were breached, 
voluntarily renegotiated, or renegotiated as a consequence of regulatory pres- 
sures during the mid- and late 1980s as oil prices and the demand for natural 
gas declined. Gas distributors and pipelines sustained large financial losses 
through the renegotiation of these contracts (on the order of $10 billion). Fur- 
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tomers who can readily turn to substitute fuels and customers who do not have 
good fuel switching capabilities. 
For the last few years, the FERC has actively embraced the unbundling of 
pipeline transportation from pipeline provision of  gas supplies and has pro- 
moted competition  for field gas by pipelines, distributors, and end users. These 
policies appear to reflect more a response to the problems caused by changing 
economic conditions and the historical legacy of price regulation than an exog- 
enous regulatory reform initiative. Unbundled pipeline transportation was ini- 
tially instituted by the pipelines themselves in an effort to respond to declining 
gas demand and their contractual obligations to producers. The primary impe- 
tus for these changes was the unanticipated reduction in the price of oil after 
1981 and the associated effects on gas demand of relatively high prices and 
quantities for gas that were specific in rigid long-term contracts written after 
1978 and before the recession of  1981-83.  These changes in energy mar- 
kets made it impossible to sustain the complex regulatory and contractual 
status quo. 
6.2.4  Property and Liability Insurance 
Many economists and other scholars view liberalization in transportation, 
communications, and energy as a triumph of sound economic analysis over 
interest groups who used the regulatory process to feather their own nests. It 
is important to recognize, however, that, just because scholarly research con- 
cludes that an industry is structurally competitive and would perform better 
without costly and inefficient price and entry controls, it does not follow that 
public policy will quickly move to remove or relax regulation. The property/ 
liability insurance industry is a case in point. 
The propertyAiability industry is structurally competitive (Joskow 1973; 
Joskow and McLaughlin 1991; Joskow and Rose 1989, 1473-75).  Concentra- 
tion ratios are low, entry is easy, and there is no evidence of excess profits or 
inefficiency in states that do not regulate insurance rates. To the extent that a 
market imperfection exists, its cause is consumers who are not fully informed 
about the financial strength of  insurers. Hence, all states set minimum stan- 
dards for the capitalization of insurance companies and place restrictions on 
their investments to protect purchasers of insurance (and insurance guarantee 
funds) from bankruptcy risks. While there may be very good reasons to subject 
insurance firms to financial regulations, especially given the presence of  an 
insurance guarantee fund in each state, one is hard pressed to find a rationale 
for subjecting insurance to either maximum or minimum price regulation. 
Yet insurance rates, especially personal lines (auto, homeowners), have been 
heavily regulated by the states since World War 11. For many years, both the 
insurance industry and its regulators relied heavily on collective price setting 
and  actively  discouraged competitive  pricing  (Joskow  1973; Joskow  and 
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subsidization, typically shifting costs from urban to rural drivers (Rottenberg 
1989). The industry and its regulators were particularly hostile to competitive 
pricing by low-cost direct writers like State Farm and Allstate. During the late 
1960s and 1970s, many states relaxed or eliminated prior approval rate regula- 
tion and encouraged independent rate making and deviations from the advisory 
rates filed by rating bureaus (Joskow and McLaughlin 1991). However, com- 
plete deregulation of insurance rates (along with the application of the antitrust 
laws)6 occurred in only a single state, Illinois. Then, during the 1980s, the 
movement toward less price regulation ground to a halt, and many states began 
increasing the scope of price regulation. 
Changes  in  insurance  rate  regulation  have  been  heavily  influenced  by 
changes in the costs of providing insurance. During the period of liberalization, 
rates were stable or falling, reflecting stable or falling loss costs and/or under- 
writing costs, and low cost competitors were seeking to expand their busi- 
nesses by offering lower rates or innovative products (Harrington 1984). Dur- 
ing this period, the regulatory debate tended to focus on minimum rather than 
maximum rate regulation and “excessive” competition, reflecting the aversion 
of  some firms to competition. When insurance rates rose rapidly, as occurred 
in many lines of insurance during the late 1980s, political pressures for maxi- 
mum rate regulation were more intense. In one case-California-extensive 
rate regulation was enacted, not by  the legislature, but by  citizen initiative. 
Ironically, swings in insurance rates depend largely on loss costs. These in turn 
depend heavily on the costs of accidents as determined by prices for repairs 
and liability rules as determined by the tort system, neither of which is subject 
to significant control by the insurance industry. 
Despite competitive opportunities in property/liability insurance, an admin- 
istration in Washington supposedly committed to removing unnecessary regu- 
lations, and pricing and availability problems, the regulatory reform movement 
of the 1980s passed the insurance industry by.  There was no meaningful na- 
tional policy regarding insurance, and many  states responded to economic 
shocks by  stopping and then reversing a trend toward less rate regulation and 
cross-subsidization that had begun during the 1970s. 
6.2.5  Banks 
The first American industry to be regulated was the banking industry, largely 
because a nation must control banking at least minimally in order to control 
its money supply and macroeconomic performance. But economic regulation 
of banks is largely a creature of the Great Depression, when widespread bank 
failures caused massive losses of personal savings among American citizens 
and contributed to deepening and lengthening the Depression. 
In some ways, bank regulation is similar to the regulation of insurance com- 
6. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides insurance firms with a limited exemption of the anti- 
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panies. Regulators control the investment portfolio of a bank to assure its fi- 
nancial health and to protect depositors against fraud. But, unlike insurance, 
bank regulation also segmented the market, imposing geographic limits on 
lending activities and focusing lending by savings and loan institutions on real 
estate mortgages. The government also insures depositors against financial loss 
should the bank fail. In the past, regulators controlled the interest rates that 
banks could pay depositors and the types of  deposits that a bank could offer. 
Finally, regulators specify the accounting practices that are used to measure 
the financial health of  a bank and regularly examine bank records to assure 
that the bank is sound and in compliance with regulations. Unlike insurance 
regulation, the federal government is  the dominant player  in  the  banking 
industry. 
Certainly, the single biggest scandal during the era of liberalization of eco- 
nomic regulation is the massive increase in bank failures during the 1980s.’ 
First, some large commercial banks failed, owing to the abrogation of loans by 
several foreign countries and massive default on agricultural loans during the 
farm crisis of the early 1980s. Then came the savings and loan debacle, in 
which a very large fraction (estimates range around one-third) of the nation’s 
savings and loans either went bankrupt or are “zombies”--walking-dead insti- 
tutions that are technically bankrupt but have not yet closed down because they 
still have a positive cash flow. 
The essence of the banking problem is that banks of all kinds-commercial, 
savings and loan, mutual savings associations, credit unions-make  a large 
number of long-term loans but rely heavily on short-term deposits to finance 
them. An important component of public policy toward banks is to provide a 
means for banks to shed long-term loans by selling them to others, leaving the 
bank as a collection agent for the source of  long-term funds. Nonetheless, 
banks still hold a considerable amount of long-term debt and so can be seri- 
ously squeezed when interest rates go up significantly.  The regulation of inter- 
est rates and investment portfolios was intended to ameliorate this problem. 
A second important element of banking regulation was the segmentation of 
the industry. Commercial banks were the source of  loans to business and 
checking account services without interest on the deposits. Savings and loans 
were primarily in the business of  financing real estate activities, especially 
housing, and obtained funds through savings accounts paying interest rates 
subject to regulatory ceilings. The major liberalizing reforms of the past de- 
cade have been to reduce substantially the distinctions between these institu- 
tions and to relax the regulation of interests rates paid on deposits. All banks 
now offer checking accounts bearing interest, and all have varieties of savings 
accounts with restrictions on short-term withdrawal but higher interest rates. 
Likewise, investment portfolios of all institutions can now contain commercial 
7. For more details about the turmoil in financial regulation during the 1980s, see the companion 
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paper (even junk bonds) as well as loans to finance all forms of physical capital 
investments. The last step in deregulation was the Garn-St.  Germain Act of 
1982, which essentially freed the savings and loan industry from nearly all the 
restrictions that distinguished it from commercial banks. These reforms made 
economic sense, for they improved the efficiency of capital markets by elimi- 
nating artificial distinctions among sources and uses of funds. Moreover, they 
should have reduced banking risks by allowing all banks to have more diversi- 
fied loan portfolios. 
The underlying problem with the banking sector is that many of its invest- 
ment turned bad, with the result that the liabilities of  some banks (deposits) 
exceeded the assets (collectable loans). But the relaxation of regulation exacer- 
bated the problem, for it took place at precisely the same time as the 1980s oil 
glut, agricultural depression, Latin American loan defaults, and real estate 
boom and bust. Meanwhile, because of deposit insurance, customers had little 
incentive to seek out banks with strong portfolios as the place to make deposits. 
Moreover, banks are very highly leveraged institutions because regulators have 
established quite low equity requirements. This means that banks have more 
funds to lend (and hence charge lower rates of interest), but it also means that 
they are vulnerable to a general rise in loan default rates. 
All these factors conspired to make the conditions of many banks, and espe- 
cially savings and loans, quite precarious. Then another effect kicked in-the 
“pending bankruptcy effect.” An owner of a bank can lose no more than the 
amount of equity invested, no matter the magnitude of the bank’s excess liabili- 
ties. Hence, when a bank (or any other corporation) nears bankruptcy, owners 
have an incentive to take very large risks-to  make loans with a high probabil- 
ity of default but at very high interest rates. If  the loans prove good, the bank 
is saved; otherwise, the federal government through deposit insurance simply 
takes a bigger loss. This is still another reason why bank portfolios had been 
regulated in the past. In fact, financial soundness reviews of banks were not 
deregulated. Bank audits continued and should have nipped the pending bank- 
ruptcy effect in the bud. 
To an important degree, the problems in banking were exacerbated by the 
fact that, in the 1980s, banks were allowed to invest in riskier loans. But, as 
explained by Romer and Weingast (1990), the magnitude of the debacle was 
not caused by deregulation. Even with more relaxed rules, bank regulators de- 
tected the problem and sought to cure it in 1985 and 1986, when its magnitude 
was still rather small. But the political leadership intervened to prevent it, pres- 
suring the agency not to close down failing banks before the losses mounted 
and not to impose more rigid financial management on banks that were in 
trouble but still viable. And, as Romer and Weingast and many lurid press 
stories report, the reasons behind these political interventions had very little to 
do with the ideology of deregulation  or the ideas of economic liberals. Instead, 
these political interventions were constituency service for generous contribu- 
tors to political campaigns and other important supporters. 
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argument that banking markets are not structurally competitive and that eco- 
nomic regulation of prices (interest rates) and entry (types of services each 
category of bank can offer) has any hope of improving on the market. But, like 
insurance, one can argue that banks ought to be subject to scrutiny of  their 
financial management, especially if  deposits are insured by  the government. 
The problems in banking arose because the attempt to relax price and entry 
controls, and so improve the efficiency of  capital markets, was erroneously 
accompanied by  less, not more, scrutiny of  financial management, primarily 
because the industry wanted to be left alone and was able to convince political 
leaders to let it be. The result was a perverse incentive structure for banks 
and depositors that turned unlucky events in financial markets into a national 
economic catastrophe. 
6.2.6  Implications from Six Industries 
Our brief  review of  six industries subject to economic regulation in  the 
1970s and subsequent regulatory change should make clear that we will not 
find a simple explanation for the significant changes in regulatory institutions 
that occurred between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. The potential for a 
reasonably competitive market structure (airlines, trucking,  banking, telephone 
equipment) appears to be a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient, condition 
to explain deregulation. The insurance industry has not been deregulated, and 
the airline, trucking, and banking industries were not more structurally com- 
petitive in 1978 than they were in 1960. Changing economic and technological 
conditions can play an important role in stimulating regulatory change (tele- 
communications, natural gas), but dramatic economic changes do not appear 
to be necessary (airlines, trucks), and economic shocks can just as easily stimu- 
late more regulation as less (insurance in the 1980s [Joskow 1973; Joskow and 
McLaughlin 19911, banks in the 1990s).  The performance of a regulated indus- 
try may  be so poor that some change is necessary to enable the industry to 
provide service of a reasonable quality, although institutional response to poor 
performance may take place very slowly (airlines, trucks). Modest regulatory 
reforms can lead to results and create constituencies  that lead to further regula- 
tory changes (telecommunications), some of  which are undesirable (banks). 
Regulatory changes may  be affected by the implementation of  other public 
policies, especially antitrust (telecommunications).  Political interventions can 
be helpful (airlines and trucking), disastrous (banks), or inconclusive (tele- 
phones). Actions by  the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and by 
state and federal authorities, can interact with one another in complex ways. 
6.3  Domestic Airlines: Deregulation of a Structurally 
Competitive Industry 
The airline industry is the cleanest example of  virtually complete deregu- 
lation of prices and entry and, along with the trucking industry, the only one 
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in which we have the most experience with deregulation and is (too) often used 
as a model for deregulation and regulatory reform in other industries. From 
roughly  1938 until  1977, the U.S. domestic airline industry was subject to 
heavy economic regulation by the Civil Aeronautics  Board (CAB).8  Regulation 
of airline safety and the operation of the air traffic control system and commer- 
cial airports were, and still are, the responsibility of a separate federal agency, 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 
The CAB determined which companies were permitted to provide commer- 
cial airline service, decided which city-pair routes they  were permitted to 
serve, set ticket prices, and, near the end, controlled many details of  service 
quality. Airlines serving the same route all charged the same fares, and most 
passengers could take advantage of one of  two fares-coach  or first class. 
These fares were determined by  a simple formula based on the average cost 
per passenger mile incurred by all airlines providing domestic air service, only 
partially taking into account cost differences associated with distance, passen- 
ger volume, and other factors affecting route-specific costs. 
Beginning in the early 1960s and continuing into the 1970s,  numerous econ- 
omists studied the consequences of CAB regulation of  airlines (Caves 1962; 
Levine 1965; Eads 1972, 1975; Douglas and Miller 1974).  In a departure from 
historical precedent, economists were in virtually complete agreement-Dem- 
ocrats and Republicans-about  the consequences of  CAB regulation. Spe- 
cifically, economists generally agreed that CAB regulation was  undesirable 
and unnecessary for three reasons. 
First, regulated prices were too high on average, were too inflexible, and did 
not reflect the relative costs of  providing service on different routes and at 
different times of the day, week, and year. Prices on long-distance and densely 
traveled routes were set especially high in an attempt to generate subsidies for 
high-cost service to small cities. An economically rational pricing structure 
not only would reduce prices generally but would also reallocate passengers to 
improve the industry’s performance. 
Second, the costs incurred by domestic airlines were too high, and air ser- 
vice was provided inefficiently. These inefficiencies emerged because ineffi- 
cient airlines were protected from competition, because CAB route allocations 
led to a route structure that did not use aircraft efficiently, and because regula- 
tory rules enhanced the bargaining power of unions, leading to excessive wages 
and inefficient work rules. In addition, because airlines could not compete on 
8. In  the United States, regulatory responsibilities are shared between the federal government 
and  the  various state governments. In  general, the provision of interstate services is subject to 
federal regulatory jurisdiction, while the provision of intrastate services is subject to state regula- 
tory jurisdiction. Because most US.  airlines are engaged in interstate commerce, they have been 
regulated almost exclusively by the federal government. The exceptions were a small number of 
intrastate airlines that provided service within the states of Alaska, California, Florida, and Texas. 
The pre-deregulation history of CAB  regulation can be found in Breyer (1982, chap. ll),  Bailey, 
Graham, and Kaplan (1985, chap. 1). and Keeler (1983). 393  Economic Regulation 
the basis of price, they competed in service quality, causing the average quality 
of service to be too high. Service quality is measured by the fraction of seats 
that are filled, the probability of finding an empty seat available on short notice, 
the provision of various amenities, and the frequency of flights between cities 
(given the total number of passengers carried). Although passengers may enjoy 
having an empty seat next to them on which to put a briefcase, regulated fares 
reflected the cost of providing seats for briefcases. Passengers were forced to 
pay for seats regardless of whether or not they wanted to provide their brief- 
cases with a comfortable ride. 
Third, scholarly studies also concluded that there was no good economic 
reason to regulate prices, the number of firms allowed to enter the industry, or 
the number of  firms allowed to provide service on specific city-pair routes. 
Students of the airline industry argued that price and entry restrictions should 
be removed because unregulated competition would yield a more efficient air- 
line system. Among other things, they argued that airline service is not a natu- 
ral monopoly, that many routes could support multiple competing airlines, and 
that the U.S.  industry could support several large national carriers. Further, 
they argued that, although few airlines might compete on any given route, the 
threat of entry would hold fares down and constrain monopoly pricing. 
Despite the consensus among professional economists about the infirmities 
of airline regulation, deregulation and regulatory reform lacked political sup- 
port until the early 1970s. Then the CAB initiated some modest rate-making 
reforms that brought prices more in line with costs and recognized the prob- 
lems of  costly excess capacity resulting from excessive prices and nonprice 
competition. Although these changes responded to some of the economists’ 
criticisms, they did so in a way that preserved the basic regulatory structure. 
Moreover, by continuing to prohibit entry and to set minimum prices that were 
above those that would prevail under competition, the agency continued to 
protect incumbents and to impose cross-subsidies. 
Executive branch support for airline deregulation first emerged during the 
Ford administration, although it led to little change. The first important source 
of  congressional political support for airline deregulation came from an un- 
expected source-liberal  Democratic Senator Edward Kennedy. Assisted by 
then-professor and regulatory critic Stephen Breyer, Kennedy poached on the 
turf of the Senate Commerce Committee by launching a much-publicized hear- 
ing on the CAB that was orchestrated to embarrass the agency. The authors 
of  studies of  the CAB were dutifully paraded  before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee to report their findings and conclusions. But, although Kennedy 
continued to support airline deregulation (an action that may  well have in- 
fluenced then-candidate Jimmy Carter), nothing much came of the Kennedy 
initiative. 
Interest in regulatory reform in general, and airline deregulation in particu- 
lar, gained political momentum during the Carter administration, stimulated in 
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US. economy. Administrative deregulation9  of  the airline industry began to 
take place during the first year of the Carter administration with the appoint- 
ment of deregulation-minded  commissioners (Alfred Kahn and Elizabeth Bai- 
ley) and with some support from Congress, especially from Senator Kennedy 
and Senator Abraham Ribicoff. Senator Ribicoff chaired the Senate Govern- 
mental Affairs Committee, and soon after Kennedy completed his airline hear- 
ings Ribicoff launched a massive, critical review of economic regulation, even- 
tually producing a multivolume series of  studies and reform proposals (see 
U.S. Senate 1977-78).  Whereas Kennedy and Ribicoff could not force Con- 
gress to take the lead, which would have stripped the Commerce Committee 
of its jurisdiction, they could, in turn, stop Commerce from slowing adminis- 
trative deregulation. Kennedy’s Judiciary Committee and Ribicoff‘s Govern- 
mental Affairs Committee were responsible for administrative procedures and 
operating methods in regulatory agencies, giving at least one of them a veto 
over laws changing regulatory procedures should they choose to exercise it. 
Eventually, facing a fait accompli, Commerce capitulated, and the chair of the 
subcommittee of Senate Commerce that had authority over airlines, Senator 
Robert Cannon, actually became an advocate of deregulation. In late 1978, the 
CAB’S administrative deregulation was codified into law along with a sunset 
provision for the agency with the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act. 
The Airline Deregulation Act provided for the gradual removal over a six- 
year period extending well into the 1980s of virtually all restrictions on entry 
into the airline industry, all restrictions on which airlines could fly  which 
routes, and all restrictions on pricing. The Reagan administration supported 
continued deregulation when it took office and appointed CAB commissioners 
committed to deregulation, with the result that by  1984 the domestic airline 
industry was freed from virtually all the old economic regulations that it had 
been subject to for forty years. 
What have been the effects of airline deregulation to date? 
6.3.1  Price Level 
The evidence on the effects of  airline deregulation on average air fares is 
clear: average fares are lower than they would have been if CAB rate making 
had continued. The vast majority of passengers pay fares that carry substantial 
discounts from the fares that would have resulted from applying the old CAB 
pricing formula. Average fares rose in the late 1980s, owing to growing de- 
mand for air service, capacity constraints in aircraft, scarce landing slots at the 
9. Administrative deregulation refers to  changes in regulatory policies instituted by  the CAB 
itself without any formal statutory authorization by the U.S. Congress. The 1938 act establishing 
the CAB did not require restrictive price and entry regulation but gave the CAB broad authority 
to  supervise the  development of the commercial  airline industry. Regulatory  procedures that 
evolved after 1938 led to virtually complete restrictions on entry and rigid price regulation. The 
regulators appointed by President Carter simply endeavored to reinterpret the statute to allow for 
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Source: U.S. Department of Transportation  (1990a. 7). 
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busiest airports, rising fuel costs, and the diminution of competition in some 
markets. Nevertheless, consumers still save billions of dollars each year in 
lower air fares as a consequence of deregulation (Morrison and Winston 1986, 
1989). Figure 6.1  displays the average fare per passenger mile from  1979 
through 1988. Inflation-adjusted prices are far below what they were in 1979. 
Of  more interest is a comparison of  actual fares with those that would have 
existed if pre-deregulation pricing policies had continued. Figure 6.2 displays 
an index of  actual prices and an index that roughly measures the prices that 
would have been charged had the pre-1978 fare formulas (SIFL, or standard 
industry fare level) continued to be used over the period 1979-88. It is clear 
that deregulated fares are, on average, lower. Morrison and Winston perform a 
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6.3.2  Price Structure 
To say that fares are more complicated now than before deregulation is an 
understatement. A wide variety of discount fares is now available in addition 
to standard coach and first class fares. Average fares vary widely from route to 
route, reflecting differences in travel density, distance, the number of compet- 
ing airlines, when passengers fly, how far in advance passengers can make a 
reservation, and whether passengers on particular routes are primarily business 
or tourist travelers (Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan 1985; Morrison and Winston 
1986; Borenstein  1989). Other things being equal (distance, density, etc.), 
prices are higher on airline routes involving a hub dominated by  one or two 
carriers at one end and on routes with only one or two competing carriers (see 
fig. 6.3). Competitive entry leads to significantly lower postentry prices (Bai- 
ley, Graham, and Kaplan 1985,61; Morrison and Winston 1986, 1989; Keeler 
1983). Fares on shorter low-density routes have risen relative to fares on other 
routes reflecting cross-subsidies built into regulated rates (see fig. 6.4). 
6.3.3  Airline Costs 
The average cost of providing airline service has declined substantially in 
the last decade (holding various input prices constant); airline productivity has 
risen significantly. Deregulation of routes caused airlines to change their route 
structures dramatically. Typically, airlines have selected a few cities (hubs) in 
which to concentrate maintenance and to base flight crews. Except for long- 
distance flights between many large cities, routes typically consist of  flights 
out of hubs, with aircraft and crew returning at night to their point of origin. 
The movement to hub and spoke systems led to more efficient utilization of 
aircraft and crews. Price competition and the threat of hostile takeovers have 
also encouraged greater efficiency, The average fraction of  seats sold has in- 
Fig. 6.3 
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Source: U.S.  Department of  Transportation (1990a, 8). 
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Source: U.S. Department of Transportation (1990~  1:12). 
creased from less than 55 percent in 1976 to over 62 percent in 1988. Competi- 
tion, including the emergence of  nonunion carriers, has also broken the power 
of airline labor unions, leading to lower wages and more flexible work rules 
(Bailey, Graham,  and Kaplan  1985, chaps. 4,  5, 8; Morrison and Winston 
1986). 
6.3.4  Quality of Service 
The quality of service has clearly declined in some dimensions and, perhaps 
less obviously, increased in others. Not all the changes in service quality are 
the direct consequence of deregulation, however. Let us look first at the ways 
in which the quality of service has declined. 398  Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. Noll 
Table 6.3  Changes in Frequency at Domestic Points, July 1979-July  1988 
% Increase 
40 Seats  Over 40 
N  and Under  Seats 
Points with an increase in frequency: 
Less than 10 percent"  38  20  18 
10.0-50.0  percent  101  42  59 
50.1-100.0  percent  79  36  43 
100.1 percent and over  52  35  17 
Total  270  133  137 
Points with a decrease in frequency: 
Less than 10 percent  27  18  9 
50.1-99.9  percent  60  53  7 
10.0-50.0 percent  140  110  30 
Total  227  181  46 
All points  497  314  183 
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation (1990h. 1:57). 
aIncludes  points with no change in frequency. Classification of points by average seating capacity 
is based on July 1988. Includes only points served in both parts. 
Reduced Service Quality 
Since deregulation,  air travel has increased, and planes and airports are more 
crowded. Because of the increase in travel, delays have increased. Some pas- 
sengers have lost service. Jet service has been cut back or eliminated in many 
small communities, and a few have lost all airline service. Decreases in flight 
frequency have been concentrated in small communities (see table 6.3), espe- 
cially those within an hour's  drive of a larger airport. Owing to hubbing, the 
fraction of passengers traveling on nonstop flights has declined. Average trip 
time has increased slightly (Morrison and Winston 1986). The average age of 
the commercial fleet has increased as airlines have extended the life of older 
aircraft. Initially, the purpose of this strategy was to control costs by deferring 
purchases of new, more costly aircraft; however, in the late 1980s airlines re- 
placed old planes and expanded their fleets as fast as manufacturers could pro- 
duce new aircraft. Then in the early 1990s the recession forced airlines to cut 
costs by keeping old planes in service. 
Many of these reductions in the quality of service were anticipated by  stu- 
dents of airline regulation (although not advertised heavily). The most severe 
problems-crowded  airports, air traffic control problems, and associated de- 
lays-are  primarily a consequence of the failure of government to expand air- 
port capacity and air traffic control capabilities in response to the surge in 
passenger volume and flights since deregulation. The lower fares and new 
routes created by deregulation substantially increased air travel (see fig. 6.5), 399  Economic Regulation 
Fig. 6.5 
Source; U.S. Department of Transportation (1990a, 2). 
Growth in weekly flights, 1978-89 
but in  1990 the number of air traffic control personnel was about the same as 
it was in  1980. President Reagan exacerbated the air congestion problem by 
firing air traffic controllers in 1981, after a strike, and again in 1987. Likewise, 
the trust fund from airline ticket taxes has been in surplus during the 1980s, 
and airport capacity in most cities has remained unchanged for nearly twenty 
years. Finally, scarce airport capacity is not allocated sensibly. In short, the 
parts of national air transport policy other than economic regulation have not 
responded to the increased demands being placed on the system. One cause is 
deregulation, which increased travel, but the  fault is a failure of other policies. 
Increased Service Quality 
The number of weekly flights has increased dramatically, and most of  the 
population is served by airports at which flight frequency has increased (see 
fig. 6.5). The number of markets served by major carriers with hub and spoke 
systems has increased dramatically. As a result, many travelers can reach most 
destinations more easily (see table 6.4). While the fraction of passengers trav- 
eling on nonstop flights has declined, the fraction of  passengers who travel 
with more convenient on-line connections has increased owing to hubbing (see 
fig. 6.6). 
6.3.5 
Conventional wisdom appears to be that airline deregulation has caused a 
reduction in competition, but the changes in market structure since 1978 are 
more complicated than first meets the eye. Three interdependent structural 
changes have taken place: entry, exit, and consolidation of new  and existing 
airlines; the movement to hub and spoke systems; and the expansion of existing 
airlines to serve new routes. 
Immediately after deregulation  began, several new, low-cost airlines entered 
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Table 6.4  Number of Points Served, Major Carriers, Month of July 1979, 1984, 
and 1988 
Number of Points Served 









































Total stations (duplicated)  531  745  1,361 
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation (199Ob. 1  :24). 
Note:  Includes service provided  by  code-sharing commuters.  Data  limited  to the  forty-eight 
contiguous states. 
Fig. 6.6  Origin-destination passengers, by routing 
Source: U.S. Department of  Transportation (1990b, Executive Summary, 12). 
the industry, and several more small, regional carriers expanded into larger, 
national airlines. In addition, numerous independent commuter airlines entered 
or expanded to provide many small communities with more frequent service. 
One effect of entry and expansion was intense price competition (Bailey, Gra- 
ham, and Kaplan 1985, chap. 5). After initial success, made possible, in part, 
by  the inefficiency of the existing airlines, virtually all the new “major” en- 
trants and many of the expanded regional carriers either failed financially, were 401  Economic Regulation 
absorbed by larger airlines because of financial difficulties, or simply merged 
with other airlines. The number of  commuter carriers also declined from its 
peak in the early 1980s, and most commuter carriers are now affiliated with a 
major airline. 
The dramatic rise and fall in the number of airlines had many causes. Some 
airlines failed as an inevitable consequence of the dramatic change in the com- 
petitive environment created by  deregulation. Some failed because of  poor 
management decisions. Some failures were due to the failure of government 
authorities to expand the air traffic control system and airport capacity to ac- 
commodate the huge increase in the number of passengers and flights that was 
induced by  lower fares and competitive entry. Some were due to bad merger 
policies applied by the Department of Transportation, which permitted several 
airline mergers that reduced rather than enhanced competition (Borenstein 
1990). Still other airlines failed as fuel prices rose and recession reduced the 
demand for air travel in 1990 and 199 1. 
The rise and fall in the number of airlines left the industry somewhat more 
concentrated in the late 1980s than it was before deregulation. In 1978, the top 
ten airlines accounted for roughly 90 percent of domestic revenue passenger 
miles (RPM). Owing to the entry and the expansion of  smaller airlines, the 
share of the top five and the top ten airlines declined until about 1985. Mergers 
and airline failures subsequently led to greater concentration among the five 
and ten largest airlines than had existed prior to deregulation (see fig. 6.7). 
There was further consolidation in response to fuel price increases and reces- 
sion in the early 1990s. 
The  expansion of  hub  and  spoke operations had  two  significant effects 
(Borenstein 1989).  First, at many large and medium hubs, the market shares of 
the dominant carriers increased significantly (see table 6.5). Second, all major 
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Fig. 6.7  Percentage of domestic RPMs by carrier rank, calendar year 1978-88 
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Table 6.5  Point Concentration, Cumulative Percentage Distribution of Total 
Enplacements"  (starting with most concentrated points) 
Hub Size  90%or  80%or  70%or  60%or  50%or  40%or  30%or 





















2.1  10.7  13.3  13.3  33.9  54.3  67.5 
...  ...  5.7  5.7  24.3  50.1  55.1 
...  ...  .7  .7  13.1  26.6  38.9 
...  ...  8.0  17.5  28.5  43.3  63.8 
...  ...  ...  5.1  11.8  26.7  50.7 
...  ...  .8  2.8  14.5  42.7  77.6 
...  .8  1.4  7.5  22.0  48.2  80.3 
.9  3.0  8.6  16.2  36.4  66.6  88.2 
10.2  10.2  .7  30.2  53.0  81.6  96.3 
32.1  38.7  52.9  64.8  82.9  92.2  100.0 
40.6  51.9  63.2  67.3  77.7  91.1  100.0 
42.4  49.4  57.6  67.7  91.5  97.3  99.3 
2.3  8.9  12.5  14.8  33.3  52.9  68.5 
1.1  1.5  6.5  7.9  24.6  48.7  57.9 
2.8  3.1  5  .O  6.6  20.2  36.8  52.3 
Source: U.S. Department of  Transportation (1990b. 1:47). 
"Although distributed on the basis of dominant carrier share, these data reflect total enplacements 
for all carriers. 
Table 6.6  Number of Large, Medium, and Small Hubs Served, Major Carriers, 
Month of July 1979,1984, and 1988 
Large Hubs  Medium Hubs  Small Hubs 









































22  28  31  7  19  44 
11  11  28  4  8  25 
17  21  28  17  30  43 
18  26  24  20  21  32 
4  8  25  4  5  32 
0  14  14  0  2  2 
5  10  17  9  21  28 
15  25  26  9  9  17 
17  31  31  22  37  45 
15  17  27  12  17  25 
Totalstations  178  238  255  124  191  251  104  169  293 
Source: OfJiciul  Airline Guide (July 1979, July 1984, and July 1988). 
Note:  Includes services provided by  code-sharing commuters. Data are limited to the forty-eight 
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Fig. 6.8  Passenger trips by competitive status 
Source; U.S. Department of Transportation (1990a, 4). 
6.6). Thus, the large airlines were increasing their market shares at individual 
hubs, and they were also expanding the number of hubs to which they provided 
at least some service. 
The cumulative effect of these changes is an increase in the number of com- 
peting airlines serving the average route. Whereas fewer domestic airlines 
serve the nation, more serve any given route owing to the growth in hubs and 
routes by  the major carriers. In 1988, a much larger fraction of travelers flew 
on routes with three or more competing carriers than was the case in 1979 (see 
fig. 6.8). 
6.3.6  Airline Safety 
The most significant concern about airline deregulation has been that it 
would lead to a significant deterioration in airline safety. The standard argu- 
ment goes something like the following. Intense competition will force airlines 
to cut costs in order to compete effectively and to provide satisfactory  earnings 
to stockholders. In the process of cutting costs, airlines will cut maintenance 
expenditures excessively or unwisely defer the replacement of  older aircraft. 
Especially during economic downturns, when pressures on earnings are most 
severe, maintenance and investment in safety may suffer as airlines try to main- 
tain earnings. The most detailed empirical evidence regarding the validity of 
this theory, produced by  Nancy Rose, is inconclusive. Rose (1990) finds no 
relation between fatalities and financial performance,  but she does find a small, 
weak effect on nonfatal accident rates. 
The concerns about the effects of  economic deregulation on airline safety 
are worthy of careful consideration,  but several observations about the relation 
between these concerns and actual experience are in order. First, although 
many argue that the margin of airline safety has declined, by all objective mea- 
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1989). Second, airline safety regulation was never the responsibility of  the 
CAB and has not been deregulated.  The Federal Aviation Administration regu- 
lates safety. Deregulation has made the FAA’s job more demanding, but the 
FAA has not grown in proportion to the number of flights and aircraft in ser- 
vice. If safety is inadequate since deregulation, the policy error is the failure 
to provide the FAA with adequate resources to do its job. Third, above all, 
airline safety is good business. Passengers are sensitive to airline fatalities and 
will avoid an airline for several months after a fatal crash (Borenstein and Zim- 
merman 1988). 
6.3.7  Overall Assessment 
Students of the airline industry broadly agree that deregulation has been a 
success from an efficiency perspective. But not all interest groups have bene- 
fited from deregulation. Smaller communities have a different type of service, 
and fares have increased on the shortest and least dense routes. The competitive 
pressures since deregulation have led to lower wages and less attractive work 
rules for airline employees. Many airlines have  lost significant amounts of 
money, and several have gone bankrupt. Deregulation has given some airlines 
market power in some routes. 
Public policy toward the U.S. airline industry in the near future is likely to 
emphasize three things. First is to remove barriers to competition created by 
dominant carriers at certain hub airports. The competitive effects of  future 
mergers will be examined more carefully. Efforts will be made to free entry at 
hub airports that are dominated by a single airline. The second policy concern 
is to increase airport capacity and to use capacity more efficiently. Because the 
lead time for new airports is long and local opposition to expansion often in- 
tense, increasing the efficiency with which existing capacity is utilized is a 
very high priority. The third policy emphasis is to intensify safety regulation 
and to improve the air traffic control system. 
6.4  Railroads: Regulatory Reform for a Sick “Natural Monopoly” 
The causes and consequences of regulatory reform in the railroad industry 
cannot be understood without an appreciation of the history of railroad regula- 
tion and its effects. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was the first 
“modern” independent federal economic regulatory agency. The Act to Regu- 
late Commerce of  1887 created the ICC as an independent federal regulatory 
agency to supervise the pricing behavior of the railroads for freight shipped in 
interstate commerce. The initial act gave the ICC relatively broad but vague 
authority to enforce a variety of common carrier obligations that were already 
covered, but difficult to enforce, by common law (Keeler 1983, 22-23).  The 
primary focus of the act was to give the ICC the authority to prohibit railroads 
from charging rates that were unduly “discriminatory.” The railroads were in 
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given commodity on individual “short-haul” segments of  a specific “long- 
haul” route. Charging different prices per ton mile for different commodities 
was not prohibited. As a result, to maximize profits, the railroads used “value 
of  service” or “value of  commodity” rate structures that involved relatively 
high prices for (then) high-valued commodities and relatively low prices for 
(then) low-valued commodities. Commodity price discrimination  has been the 
norm  throughout the  hundred-year history of  federal regulation of  freight 
transportation. 
As interpreted by the courts, the 1887 act did not specifically give the ICC 
authority to set minimum or maximum rates based on cost of  service prin- 
ciples, require regulatory approval for rate changes, or provide for penalties 
for charging prices that the ICC found to be discriminatory. Nor did the ICC 
have  any  authority over entry or exit. Entry and exit were regulated by  the 
states through railroad charters or via common law obligations  placed on com- 
mon carriers (Keeler 1983, 19-24).  The ICC could only reject rates and request 
that railroads file new  ones if it determined that existing rates were unjust, 
unreasonable, or discriminatory. 
The rate-making authority of the ICC was expanded significantly by a series 
of  amendments to the Act to Regulate Commerce passed between 1903 and 
1910. These amendments gave the ICC the authority to set maximum rates 
and to suspend rate changes pending an investigation of their reasonableness, 
provided penalties for discriminatory pricing, and plugged loopholes in the 
provisions barring short-haul versus long-haul rate discrimination.  These same 
amendments also extended the jurisdiction of the ICC to interstate telecommu- 
nications, which was governed by the same regulatory system as railroads until 
the FCC was created in 1934. 
ICC regulatory decisions preceding World War I and during the initial years 
of the war, a period of rapid inflation, placed burdensome financial constraints 
on many railroads. Several railroads went bankrupt or were forced to reorga- 
nize between 1906 and the entry of the United States into the war in Europe, 
and the railroads were accused of making inadequate investments in right of 
way and rolling stock to provide reliable service to shippers.’O Soon after the 
United States entered the war, the railroad system was taken over by the federal 
government, and significant rate increases were put into effect. In  1920, the 
railroad industry was returned to private management in conjunction with the 
passage of the Transportation Act of  1920. The 1920 act gave the ICC perva- 
sive regulatory authority to set minimum and maximum rates and rate struc- 
tures, to certify railroads to provide transportation services for specific com- 
modities  on  specific  routes,  to  determine whether  railroads  could  cease 
10. The poor financial performance of  the railroads during the Progressive Era has largely been 
ignored by  students of  the  political economy of railroad regulation. This is especially  true  of 
revisionists who seek to argue that the legislation passed by Congress between 1903 and 1910 and 
ICC actions implementing the associated statutory authority were designed to benefit the railroads 
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providing service on specific routes (abandonment),  and to encourage rational- 
ization of the railroad industry through mergers. The 1920 act preempted state 
authority over entry, exit, and reorganization of railroads. The ICC regulatory 
umbrella was extended to the trucking industry in 1935 and to certain types 
of  barge transportation in  1940. These acts had the effect of almost entirely 
suppressing price competition among railroads and between  railroads and 
competing modes. 
A great deal has been written about the economic motivation for federal 
regulation of the railroads. One view is that railroad regulation is motivated by 
the need to constrain monopoly power. Railroad monopolies supposedly arose 
because of  the economies of  scale and  sunk costs associated with railroad 
rights of way, terminals, and networks, combined with the limited competitive 
alternatives that many shippers faced in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Others 
argue that regulation was introduced to protect the railroads from competition. 
Here the argument is that price regulation was first sought to limit cheating 
on  collusive pricing agreements by  railroad cartels. According to this view, 
regulation would be used to place a floor rather than a ceiling on prices. The 
producer protection motivation is associated with the subsequent extension of 
ICC regulation to trucking in 1935 and to certain barge transportation in 1940. 
Still another view associates changes in railroad regulation with more complex 
interest group politics, finding winners and losers among both railroads and 
shippers (Gilligan, Marshall, and Weingast 1989). 
Whatever one’s views about the origins of regulation, by the 1950s regula- 
tory constraints on rates, combined with growing competition from alternative 
transport modes, began to place severe financial burdens on the railroads. The 
first severe financial problem emerged in passenger service. It then spread to 
freight transportation, as modern trucks traveling on an expanding interstate 
highway system siphoned off more and more of the railroads’ highest-valued 
freight. The railroads were propped up with loans and rate adjustments and 
eventually were allowed to abandon passenger service entirely. By the early 
197Os, many Eastern and some Midwestern railroads were bankrupt, and oth- 
ers faced deteriorating financial performance. Maintenance and investments in 
tracks, rights of way,  and rolling stock were inadequate, and the quality of 
railroad freight transportation was deteriorating rapidly. 
In the mid-l950s, the railroads began to recognize that the existing regula- 
tory structure was increasingly disadvantageous to them and increasingly ad- 
vantageous to their competitors (Keeler 1983, 29). They sought more pricing 
freedom from the ICC and Congress to adjust rates to reflect changing cost 
and competitive conditions. The railroads’ efforts met with very limited suc- 
cess. Efforts to raise rates on commodities where railroads had a competitive 
advantage over trucks and barges (coal and other bulk commodities and long- 
haul traffic) were resisted by shippers. Efforts to abandon service where rail- 
roads could not  compete economically with trucks were resisted by  those 
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compete more effectively with trucks and barges (manufactured commodities, 
shorter hauls) were opposed by  competing truckers. The railroads also had 
agreed to union wage and work rules that were excessively costly and blocked 
improvements in efficiency. Basically, the railroads found themselves stuck 
with price structures, route structures, and labor relations that reflected the 
economic conditions of the 1920s and 1930s (Hilton 1969).  Because of regula- 
tory (and court) restrictions on the ability of the railroads to respond to chang- 
ing  economic conditions, reflecting  opposition from competitors and  cus- 
tomers who benefited from the status quo, the railroad industry was rapidly 
self-destructing  by the 1970s. 
The problems faced by the railroad industry were widely recognized by the 
1960s (Friedlaender 1969) and grew progressively worse during the 1970s. Yet 
regulators and legislators did relatively little to ameliorate them until well into 
the Carter administration. Many students of the railroads and their regulation 
recognized that a financially viable and efficient railroad industry required rate 
adjustments, route  rationalization, and  industry  reorganization (mergers). 
Some argued that competition among railroads and between railroads and 
other modes would provide adequate competitive constraints on prices for 
most routes and commodities so that regulation of railroad rates could be lim- 
ited to situations where shippers did not have good competitive alternatives 
(captive shippers). 
In  1976, Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Re- 
form Act (4R Act), which gave the ICC greater freedom to permit necessary 
mergers, rate flexibility, and the abandonment of unprofitable routes. But the 
ICC, responding to competitor and shipper opposition, interpreted the 4R Act 
narrowly, and it led to little change. During the Carter administration,  the new 
ICC commissioners  who favored price and entry competition for trucking also 
adopted a more expansive interpretation of the 4R Act. They allowed increased 
price flexibility and expedited route abandonment and merger applications. 
In  1980, Congress passed the Staggers Rail Act, which gave the ICC ex- 
panded authority to give the railroads considerably  more pricing flexibility and 
to allow abandonments of uneconomic routes. As with similar legislation en- 
acted for the airline and trucking industries, the Staggers Act expressed a clear 
congressional intent to change the underlying rationale for railroad regulatory 
policy.  Rather than  working under  the  assumption that  price competition 
needed to be suppressed, the new legislation adopted the view that railroads 
should be given substantial freedom to set prices and to enter or exit markets 
and that price regulation should be limited to situations where the railroads 
had monopoly power. It also recognized that, because many shippers had com- 
petitive alternatives, stringent enforcement  of historical railroad service obliga- 
tions was no longer necessary. Proponents of  railroad deregulation no doubt 
benefited here from contemporaneous changes affecting airlines and trucking. 
The Staggers Act did not technically deregulate the railroads. Opponents of 
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getting regulatory protections written into the 1980 statute. Nevertheless, the 
Reagan-era ICC used its new  statutory authority to give the railroads almost 
complete freedom to set rates and to abandon routes. The consequences of 
these reforms have not been studied nearly as intensively as has deregulation 
of the airlines. Nevertheless, regulatory reform appears to have had dramatic 
effects on the railroad industry (Rose  1988; Moore  1986, 1988; Barnekov 
1987; Keeler 1983). Railroads have cut costs, reduced track mileage, expanded 
combined raiYtruck and raiVbarge services, renegotiated union agreements, 
restructured rates, and increasingly relied on confidential contracts with ship- 
pers rather than filed tariffs. There has also been significant consolidation of 
the industry through end-to-end and parallel line mergers, although the ICC 
drew the line on parallel mergers when it rejected the proposed merger of the 
Sante Fe and the Southern Pacific railroads. Conrail, formed by  the federal 
government out of pieces of the bankrupt Eastern railroads, was returned to the 
private sector. 
Perhaps the most controversial issue associated with the debate about rail- 
road pricing flexibility was its effects on average rates. Opponents of deregula- 
tion argued that railroads had monopoly power and that rates would rise after 
deregulation; however, average real and nominal rail freight transport rates 
have fallen since 1980 (see fig. 6.9). While the rates for some commodities 
over some routes have risen, real rail freight rates have declined at least slightly 
for every commodity group since 1980 (using the GNP deflator). The feared 
dramatic increases in coal transportation rates have been limited to situations 
where shippers are served by a single railroad and have also been constrained 
by the depressed state of the coal market since the mid-1980s (Joskow 1990). 
Despite the decline in rail rates, railroad profitability has increased (see fig. 
6.10). The railroad industry has been able both to reduce rates and to increase 
profitability by  cutting costs, abandoning unprofitable routes, consolidating 
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operations, and increasing productivity. Railroad employment has declined 
dramatically since 1980 (see fig. 6.11), and worker productivity (as measured 
by revenue ton miles per employee) has increased (see fig. 6.12). Although the 
careful study of  the effects of  deregulation on truck drivers' wages done by 
Nancy Rose (1987) has not been performed for railroad workers, real wages 
appear to have stabilized since the early 1980s (see fig. 6.13). Overall, railroad 
deregulation in the 1980s achieved most of  what proponents of deregulation 
had promised. We began the 1990s with a healthy railroad industry that looks 
very different from the one that existed in 1980. 
6.5  Telecommunications:  Restructuring and Regulatory Reform to 
Encourage Competition 
Until the early  1970s, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT&T) had a monopoly over almost all segments of the U.S. telecommunica- 
tions  industry. Through  full  or  partial  stock ownership, AT&T  controlled 
roughly two dozen Bell operating companies (BOCs-New  York Telephone, 
New  England Telephone, Pacific Telephone, etc.), which provided local ser- 
vice to approximately 85 percent of Americans and intrastate long-distance 
telephone services to virtually all residential and business customers in the 
United States. These local operating companies were (and are) subject to price 
regulation by  state regulatory agencies."  AT&T Long Lines had a de facto 
monopoly over commercial interstate long-distance service. Its rates and ser- 
vices were (and are) regulated by  the Federal Communications Commission 
I 1. Whereas regulation of the airline and railroad industries involved primarily federal regnla- 
tory agencies, the evolution of public policy in telecommunications involves an important role for 
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(FCC), which also has jurisdiction over the radio spectrum, including broad- 
cast television, microwave systems, and radio telephony. 
Western Electric, a wholly owned, unregulated subsidiary of  AT&T, pro- 
duced virtually all the telephone transmission and switching equipment used 
by AT&T affiliates and the customer premises equipment (i.e., telephones) of- 
fered to the BOCs’ customers. Because AT&T was a virtual monopoly supplier 
of telephone service, Western Electric effectively had a virtual monopoly over 
the supply of telephone transmission and switching equipment. Because AT& 
T generally required customers to use customer premises equipment (CPE) 
provided by  AT&T and bundled the sale of  telephone service and CPE to- 
gether, Western Electric had a virtually complete monopoly on customer prem- 
ises equipment as well. 
The FCC was never as protective of AT&T as the CAB had been of airlines 
or the ICC had been of trucking. During the 1960s and 1970s, the FCC began 
to open two key components of the telecommunications  industry to competi- 
tion. In particular, it first grudgingly allowed, and eventually encouraged, com- 
petitors to provide terminal equipment (e.g., telephones and switchboards) to 
AT&T consumers. It also allowed competing long-distance service companies 
like MCI and Sprint to enter the market. The political and economic pressures 
that led to these changes in regulatory policies are complex. We will focus on 
technological changes that played an important role in stimulating competitive 
pressures and regulatory reform. 
6.5.1  Structural Issues 
As with railroads, an understanding of contemporary  issues in telecommuni- 
cations policy requires an understanding of the history of the industry and its 
regulation. The proper scope of competition has been a continuing source of 
controversy throughout the twentieth century. AT&T became a ubiquitous tele- 
communications monopoly because it used its control over the only viable 
long-distance technology to force independent local telephone companies to 
merge with it. At the turn of the century, local telephone companies competed 
directly for customers. The controversy of the day was how best to deal with 
the long-distance monopoly: by  creating a matching local service monopoly 
(the solution proposed by AT&T) or by requiring mandatory interconnection 
of AT&T’s long-distance system to all local telephone companies (the solution 
advanced by independent telephone companies). 
AT&T achieved its monopoly but was also subject to economic regulation. 
In 1910, regulation of interstate telephone service was given to the ICC. But 
the structure of AT&T continued to be controversial into the 1930s. During the 
debate over the Communications  Act of  1934, which established the FCC, the 
ownership of Western Electric by AT&T became a major issue. Some drafts of 
the act contained strong language favoring competition and even instructed the 
agency to restructure the industry; however, the act as passed simply listed 
competition as a consideration and ordered the FCC to study the issue and 
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By the time the FCC finished its study, World War I1 had begun, and Con- 
gress and the president were otherwise occupied. But, as soon as the war 
ended, the controversy reemerged. Developments in microwave technology 
during the war created new opportunities for business users to construct their 
own private intracorporate telecommunications systems rather than relying on 
AT&T and its affiliates. Hence, both potential competitors to AT&T’s monop- 
oly and large businesses petitioned the FCC to  allow them to use this new 
technology. After a decade of  investigation and debate, the FCC issued the 
Above 890 decision, allowing the construction of private microwave systems 
to enable large firms to bypass AT&T for their internal telecommunications re- 
quirements. 
Meanwhile, AT&T’s ownership of Western Electric continued to be an issue. 
During the war,  the computer industry had been born, and electronics had 
grown substantially. Firms in these industries saw a lucrative prospect in sell- 
ing equipment to telephone companies but could not owing to their vertical 
integration into manufacturing. In  1949, the Truman administration filed an 
antitrust suit against AT&T that sought divestiture of Western Electric, which 
the Eisenhower administration quickly settled at virtually no cost to AT&T. 
The Above 890 decision led naturally to a desire by owners and builders of 
private microwave systems to sell services to others. Likewise, satellite tech- 
nology offered still another basis for competitive entry. Responding to these 
developments, the FCC began issuing a steady stream of decisions that gradu- 
ally introduced competition into all aspects of telecommunications-even  to 
a limited extent in local access. In long distance, the FCC decided in 1969 to 
allow MCI to compete with AT&T in offering private line common carrier 
service between St. Louis and Chicago. A year later, in the Specialized Com- 
mon Carrier decision, the FCC opened private lines generally to competitive 
entry. In 1968, in the Carterfone decision, the FCC established technical rules 
that permitted some customer equipment that was not owned by the telephone 
company to be interconnected to the network; five years later, it generalized 
this decision by completely opening the customer equipment market to compe- 
tition. The FCC also adopted the “open skies” policy for communications sat- 
ellites, allowing anyone (except AT&T, which was initially barred) to launch 
domestic telecommunications satellites for any purpose. All these monumental 
decisions occurred before any generic deregulation movement and industry 
restructuring resulting from antitrust litigation and before much had been pub- 
lished by economists on the economics of the industry. 
The FCC took a major retrograde step in its general move toward liberaliza- 
tion at about the time deregulation started to become popular elsewhere. In the 
1976 Execunet decision, the FCC decided to draw the line on how far competi- 
tion would be stretched. Execunet was MCI’s conventional long-distance ser- 
vice. The FCC ruled that MCI could not enter this market, concluding that 
AT&T ought to have a protected monopoly in ordinary toll service. MCI ap- 
pealed, and the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled in its favor, stating that the Com- 413  Economic Regulation 
munications Act (unlike many regulatory statutes) contained a presumption in 
favor of  competition and that the agency bore a burden of proof to show that 
long-distance competition was not in the public interest. By the time this deci- 
sion was rendered, Carter appointees controlled the FCC and, as elsewhere, 
were ardently pursuing liberalization in all aspects of communications regula- 
tion. These officials decided not to try to establish an evidentiary record that 
would sustain the original decision. 
Despite the generally procompetitive policies of the FCC, AT&T’s  control 
over the local switched telephone exchange gave it the power to block or slow 
down these competitive developments. Competing suppliers of long-distance 
service needed access to the local exchange system to make their services 
available to most customers. AT&T first denied them access and then provided 
an inferior type.I2 Competing suppliers of customer premises equipment had 
to be able to connect their equipment to the local loop and to be able to market 
their equipment on  a  “level playing  field”  with AT&T  equipment. AT&T 
enforced stringent interconnection conditions that made it costly for compet- 
ing equipment to be used by  customers and, through bundling of  telephone 
and equipment services, forced customers to pay AT&T for customer premises 
equipment even if they did not use AT&T’s equipment. New data and infor- 
mation services required upgrading of  the local and long-distance network. 
AT&T was slow to facilitate these services’ availability. To do so meant retiring 
equipment that, according to the regulatory rules, would have continued to earn 
a profit for AT&T. Moreover, it meant forgoing the possibility that AT&T could 
monopolize these services when Bell was ready to provide them. State regula- 
tors were also concerned that AT&T was overcharging itself for Western Elec- 
tric equipment, then passing these inflated costs through in regulated rates 
charged  to  customers. This behavior,  it  was  argued, made  it  possible for 
AT&T to evade state rate regulation by  shifting profits back to its unregulated 
subsidiary via excessive transfer prices.I3 
AT&T’s monopoly had attracted the attention of the antitrust authorities at 
the US. Department of  Justice since the turn of  the century.I4 In 1974, the 
12. A still controversial issue is whether the entry of long-distance carriers occurred  simply 
because the regulated price structure forced AT&T’s long-distance prices to he far above costs. On 
the one hand, competitors paid far less to local telephone companies. On the other hand, they were 
provided a distinctly inferior form of local access. Eventually, when BOCs were forced to provide 
equal access at the same price charged to AT&T, all the competitive long-distance carriers chose 
equal access rather than continued inferior access at a lower price. This suggests that the cost of 
inferior access exceeded the benefit of a lower price. 
13.  The evidence on this point is weak. Western Electric did cut prices after divestiture, but only 
after radically restructuring the company to cut costs. A more plausible story is that AT&T had 
simply grown fat from lack of competitive pressures. The evidence that AT&T delayed the intro- 
duction of new products and services to protect its “rate base” equipment and services monopoly 
was much stronger. 
14. Antitrust concerns and challenges arising from AT&T’s relation with Western Electric were 
first raised in 1908 and were serious at the time of the passage of the Communications  Act of 
1934, which transferred regulation of AT&T from the ICC to the FCC and ordered the new com- 
mission to study these relations. That study identified a variety of problems. The government then 414  Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. Noll 
Department of Justice brought an antitrust suit against AT&T.I5 The govern- 
ment charged that AT&T had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by mo- 
nopolizing or attempting to monopolize a variety of telecommunications  mar- 
kets. The basic theory underlying the relief sought by the Justice Department 
was that the only portion of the telecommunications business that was likely to 
remain a monopoly was the local switched exchange system.16 Long-distance 
interexchange service was conducive to competition, as was the provision of 
telephone switching equipment, customer premises equipment, and informa- 
tion services. As a firm  that operated at all levels of the telephone business, 
AT&T had a conflict of  interest. It had incentives to use its control over the 
monopoly segment of the business-the  local loop-to  protect itself from 
competition in the other segments of the business. It was argued further that 
the FCC was unable to regulate access to the local loop effectively, given the 
conflict of interest that existed between AT&T affiliates and even between state 
and federal regulation. As a result, the Department of Justice argued that the 
only way  that competition could flourish in potentially competitive segments 
of  the business was to prevent AT&T  from using its control over the local 
exchanges to thwart competition in these other markets. 
The antitrust suit against AT&T was settled in 1982 with the government 
getting most of  the remedies that it sought. The settlement separated AT&T 
from its local operating companies (BOCs). The local operating companies 
were organized into seven separate, independent  holding companies.  Each pro- 
vides local exchange and intrastate interexchange services in a specific region 
of the country. They were also required to provide “equal access” to competing 
long-distance  companies.  The local exchange networks could remain legal mo- 
nopolies, subject to state rate regulation, at the discretion of the states. AT&T 
was allowed to retain Western Electric and most of Bell Labs. The local op- 
erating companies were given part of Bell Labs, now called Bell Communica- 
tions Research, as a jointly owned research-and-development facility but were 
forbidden to manufacture telephone switching, transmission, and customer 
premises equipment, to offer long-distance service, or to offer certain informa- 
tion services within their franchise areas. These restrictions are subject to re- 
view every three years by  the federal court administering the 1982 consent 
brought an antitrust suit against AT&T after World War I1 seeking divestiture of Western Electric. 
This suit was settled in  1956 without requiring AT&T to divest Western Electric as the antitrust 
authorities had initially requested. 
15. For more details on the contentions of both sides of the case, see No11 and Owen (1988). 
16. A common claim is that Justice accepted the view that local service was a natural monopoly. 
In fact, Justice actually assumed that, regardless of the technical facts, state regulation and an 
incumbency advantage were likely to make local service a monopoly for the foreseeable future. 
But radio technology could prove this to be a poor forecast. By 1988, William Baxter, the assistant 
attorney general for antitrust, who negotiated the divestiture agreement, opined that the biggest 
mistake in the restructuring of  telecommunications was letting the BOCs, rather than AT&T, in- 
herit the rights to radio telephone service. 415  Economic Regulation 
decree that accompanied the settlement of the government’s antitrust case. The 
reorganization officially took effect in 1984. 
The final irony of the history of  structural controversy in telecommunica- 
tions is the reversal of field by the Reagan administration  Department of Justice 
on the basic theory of the AT&T divestiture.  AT&T was formally broken apart 
in 1984; by 1986, the Department of Justice was advocating permitting the Bell 
operating companies to reintegrate into nearly all the prohibited competitive 
markets: manufacturing, information services, and long distance (except in 
their own service territories). The antitrust authorities argued that they now 
believed that regulatory authorities could prevent local telephone companies 
from making use of their local franchised monopolies for anticompetitive pur- 
poses in other parts of the industry. The fact that the late Reagan administration 
would propose undoing most of the early Reagan administration’s single most 
important policy accomplishments in telecommunications is testimony to the 
enduring nature of the controversy over the structure of the industry. 
Major liberalizing decisions by federal regulators took place in the 1980s 
regarding radio telephone services. Historically, the FCC assigned mobile tele- 
phone frequencies to specific industries for specific purposes. But, during the 
1980s, the FCC  has moved to a general first-come, first-served system that 
encourages joint and multiple uses. As a result, the spectrum allocated for 
mobile radio telecommunications is becoming less Balkanized and more like 
a traditional common carrier service-only  in this case with multiple competi- 
tors. Second, in permitting the use of cellular telephone technology, the FCC 
rejected AT&T’s proposal to create a single monopoly supplier and instead 
created a duopoly. This assured that at least one cellular operator in each city 
is not the local telephone company and therefore has no interest in making 
certain that cellular does not compete with the traditional local telephone net- 
work as a means of basic access. Moreover, because of policies liberalizing 
other mobile services, radio access to the telephone network is slowly growing 
among other radio licensees, notably so-called specialized mobile telecommu- 
nications. Today radio technology is too expensive and too inefficient in its use 
of  the radio spectrum to be a viable competitor for local telephone access. 
But digital technology already developed but not deployed solves the spectrum 
problem, and the next technical generation down the line is expected to lower 
radio telephone costs to approximately 150-200 percent of wireline access. At 
this level, with its added valuable feature of mobility, radio telephone service 
holds the promise of becoming a viable competitor to local telephone com- 
panies. 
6.5.2  Pricing Issues 
Historically, pricing in telecommunications has been extremely inefficient. 
Prices bore little relation to the costs of corresponding services and carried a 
heavy burden of cross-subsidy. In general, these subsidies ran from long dis- 
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long-distance tolls. The cornerstone of the system was and is the basic monthly 
access charge for residents and businesses to connect to the telecommunica- 
tions network through the nearest switch of the company that has the monopoly 
franchise to provide local service. Basic access is priced substantially lower 
for residences than for businesses; however, businesses have a second access 
possibility that reduces their costs substantially. If a business uses a large num- 
ber of access lines, it can buy Centrex. The primary feature of Centrex is that 
it enables one person in an office to call another by dialing fewer numbers, but 
all such calls are routed through the local telephone company’s nearest central 
office switch, just as if they were local calls. By purchasing Centrex, a com- 
pany pays the high business access price only for a portion (10-20  percent) of 
its access lines. The rest are priced much lower-even  lower than residential 
access. 
The purpose of Centrex pricing is to induce companies not to buy their own 
small switch for handling their own intraoffice calls. This not only keeps the 
customer buying lots of lines but also eliminates some “bypass” possibilities 
for long distance, as explained below. Of course, whether Centrex is simply a 
reasonable competitive offering or a classic example of regulated monopolies 
engaging in cross-subsidization is a matter of continuing controversy. Compet- 
itors claim that Centrex must be subsidized if residential local access is subsi- 
dized because the former rate is lower than the latter. Local telephone compa- 
nies respond that Centrex customers are, on average, less than half as far from 
the central office switch as other customers and so require less investment. 
Competitors respond that no other access prices are based on distance to the 
switch and that, in any case, telephone companies decide where to locate 
switches and can select these locations strategically to make Centrex costs 
lower but residential access more expensive. The debate is endless and proves 
mainly that regulatory cost allocation procedures rarely can resolve a dispute 
about whether a telephone company is setting anticompetitive or procompeti- 
tive prices. 
Long-distance prices do not distinguish between residences and businesses, 
but they do come in three general types: interexchange toll calls, intrastate 
inter-LATA toll calls, and interstate toll calls. Interexchange service is a call 
within the local service territory of a local telephone company that must be 
transported from one central office switch to another. Often adjacent central 
office switches are connected by dedicated trunks, and companies usually im- 
pose no toll charge for such a call. But some calls within a local service terri- 
tory-called  a local access and transport area (LATA)-travel  hundreds of 
miles and are indistinguishable from other forms of long distance. Neverthe- 
less, in most states, local telephone companies have a legal, franchised monop- 
oly in these intra-LATA toll calls as well. In these states, carriers such as AT& 
T or MCI either are barred altogether from permitting such calls on their net- 
work or, if they make them, are required to pay the local telephone company 
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network. In general, intra-LATA  toll prices are extremely high in relation to 
cost. Long-distance calls within LATAs by local telephone companies account 
for approximately 25 percent of all long-distance revenues and cover almost 
as large a share of local exchange costs as did interstate long distance prior to 
the regulatory changes of the 1980s. 
The second category of long-distance service is calling between LATAs- 
or between the service territories of  a local company (or two local compa- 
nies)-within  the same state. The prices for these intrastate inter-LATA toll 
calls, as well as entry conditions, are regulated by  states, except that, since 
1984, the divestiture agreement has barred Bell operating companies from pro- 
viding this service. States could hand this service entirely to a single long- 
distance carrier, and a few small states did so after divestiture. But, in general, 
this market contains numerous firms. States sometimes regulate the price of 
intrastate inter-LATA long distance; however, because long distance is becom- 
ing substantially competitive, the most important regulated price is the charge 
the long-distance carriers pay to reach their customers through the local tele- 
phone network. Most states set usage-based carrier access charges-that  is, 
they tack on a charge per minute of use to long-distance calling that is given 
to local telephone companies. In some cases, this charge equals or exceeds the 
charge for the long-distance portion of the call, despite the fact that the latter 
can be for hundreds of miles but the former is for only a few miles. 
Finally, the federal government (i.e., the FCC) regulates long-distance call- 
ing between states. Divestiture barred Bell operating companies, but not other 
providers of local service, from the interstate long-distance market. The federal 
government regulates only AT&T’s  prices and even here has been a passive 
player, for AT&T annually or more frequently initiates proposals to lower its 
rates. In addition to AT&T, MCI, and Sprint, the market contains a few addi- 
tional national companies and many regional companies. The latter normally 
offer their customers the opportunity to call anywhere, but all or most of their 
network is simply leased space on the networks of  the three larger players. 
The small facilities-based carriers design their routes to minimize costs in a 
particular region, focusing their marketing on customers whose long-distance 
calling is predominantly to a few cities. 
The most important price that federal regulators control is the access charge 
by  local telephone companies for interstate long-distance origination and ter- 
mination in a local exchange. Until the mid-I980s, all access charges were 
carrier use charges, and approximately half the costs of the three major long- 
distance carriers were payments to local telephone companies. In  1985, the 
FCC began to transfer the federal share of local cost responsibility-about  25 
percent of the total cost of  local exchange service-to  a monthly subscriber 
line charge. To a subscriber, this charge is indistinguishable from the monthly 
access price set by  the state. By  1990, the FCC had transferred about half 
the federal share of local costs to subscriber line charges; this, in turn, meant 
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the first five years after the policy was adopted but also about a 20 percent 
increase in residential access prices and a 10 percent increase in business ac- 
cess prices. 
The last important aspect of the telephone system is the pricing of so-called 
bypass services. A customer can avoid paying carrier access charges in the 
originating local telephone area by connecting directly to a long-distance net- 
work. Local telephone companies and long-distance carriers both sell “private 
line” service that enables a customer to do this. A private line can connect the 
customer to the entire network of a long-distance carrier, to a specific office in 
another city, or to another local calling area. The second is the business that 
MCI initially entered in 1969, but it quickly began offering the first and third 
as well. The Execunet case arose when MCI offered long distance without a 
private line. 
Because carrier usage charges are still a significant part of long-distance 
charges and were half of them before 1985, usage fees create an incentive for 
large customers to use bypass-even  if it is actually more costly (in terms of 
actual costs, not prices). Seeing this irrationality in pricing, MCI and Sprint 
picked bypass (private lines) as their point of entry for precisely this reason. 
They could offer large business customers massive savings in long-distance 
charges, inducing them to try these upstart competitors against Ma Bell. 
From an efficiency perspective, the problem is paying for a fixed cost (the 
local access connection) with a usage-based charge. This prevents the price of 
usage from equaling its cost and thereby discourages use. The compensating 
price change is lower lump sum access charges for connections to the local 
exchange. The justification given for this practice is to encourage “universal 
service,” that is, telephone subscription by  every household. But, in  an ad- 
vanced economy like the that of United States, lower access charges for con- 
nection to the local loop do not encourage much increase in the penetration of 
telephone service. In the United States, the demand for access is almost per- 
fectly inelastic for all business and all but the poorest households. Virtually 
everyone has a telephone and would continue to have one if the price went up 
a few dollars. Hence, carrier usage charges reduce long-distance calling but 
produce almost no offsetting increase in basic access subscription.  This consti- 
tutes almost a total net loss from a societal perspective. 
The importance of carrier access charges goes beyond their distorting effect 
on ordinary long-distance telephone calls; it also distorts the development of 
new information services. Most of these services use a large, centralized data 
base and are most efficiently used by accessing them for a large area-perhaps 
the entire country-by  long distance. For smaller customers without bypass 
alternatives, carrier use charges discourage use. Meanwhile, purely local ser- 
vices are encouraged because local usage charges are either zero (most resi- 
dences) or small (businesses) compared to long distance. Hence, the price 
structure tends to distort the types of information services that are offered to 
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The FCC’s pricing policy since divestiture has been to lower usage charges 
to the small actual costs of usage and to increase monthly access prices to 
cover the rest of the federal share of local service costs. From an economic 
efficiency standpoint, this is an excellent policy. From a political standpoint, it 
is extremely controversial. Indeed, in January 1986, Congress fell one Senate 
vote short of overturning this policy (it had already passed the House). This is 
a very puzzling circumstance. The explanation probably lies in two facts about 
the economics and politics of  telephones. First, many people make very few 
interstate long-distance calls. One study by Texas regulators found that most 
customers make one or zero interstate calls per month, but, of course, Texas is 
a very big state. A large part of long-distance calling is for business and so is 
not paid by  individuals directly; instead, it is buried in the costs of business 
products and services. Second, the monthly basic charge for access is a visible 
price faced by  almost all Americans; long-distance charges, by contrast, are 
less visible and far more complex. It is far easier to see and to become aware 
of a change in access prices than a change in long-distance prices. Thus, the 
FCC’s policy initiative increases a visible, widely shared price in return for 
lowering a large number of largely invisible ones. Political leaders most likely 
were not so much voting against efficiency or in favor of a local telephone 
company special interest as they were simply fearing that voters would react 
negatively to this particular kind of  change. Nonetheless, in the closest con- 
gressional vote in the regulatory reform era, efficiency won-but  only after 
the FCC had trimmed its sails by promising to phase in subscriber line charges 
over several years. Thus, the efficiency benefits of the plan will accrue gradu- 
ally in hopes that it will minimize the chance of  political backlash against 
increases in basic access prices. 
6.5.3  Postreform Performance 
What have been the effects of the dramatic change in the structure and regu- 
lation of  the telecommunications industry? It is useful to examine what has 
happened in each of the segments of the telecommunications business since 
AT&T was reorganized in 1984 (for more details, see No11 and Owen 1989). 
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) 
Now that customer premises equipment has been unbundled from telephone 
service, interconnection  restrictions removed, and self-dealing  conflicts largely 
eliminated, a vigorously competitive market has emerged. Equipment prices 
have fallen, and the kinds of equipment that are available have increased. De- 
spite Western Electric’s historical claims that it was an efficient equipment 
supplier, offering customers what they needed at a fair price, it has not been 
successful as a CPE supplier in this new competitive environment. Western’s 
market share has fallen from 85 to 20 percent. This fall began before divesti- 
ture, owing to FCC policies to unbundle CPE and to promote competition 
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Telephone Transmission and Switching Equipment (TSE) 
The evolution of  competition in telephone switching equipment has been 
slower. Competition has increased as the BOCs have turned to some suppliers 
other than AT&T/Western. AT&T is still the major player, with a national mar- 
ket share of about 60 percent (down from 85 percent before divestiture).  North- 
ern Telecom, the manufacturing arm of  Bell Canada, is second. Contrary to 
common belief, European and Japanese firms have not been particularly suc- 
cessful in the market, although, by buying U.S. production facilities, Siemens 
appears well positioned to become a third significant supplier. Competitive 
pressures have stimulated more rapid diffusion of new TSE technology, espe- 
cially fiber optic transmission lines, computerized switching equipment, and 
digital networks. Much of this equipment is provided by computer and micro- 
electronic firms that were not in the industry in the early 1980s. 
Long-Distance Service 
Three strong players compete in the long-distance market offering voice and 
data services throughout the entire United States. Prices for a wide variety of 
long-distance voice, data, and video services have fallen dramatically. A wide 
array of specialized services are available to business and residential custom- 
ers. The major issue remaining with regard to competition in long-distance 
markets is when competition will permit complete deregulation. AT&T still 
has about 60 percent of the market, although its market share understates the 
intensity of competition. In 1989, the FCC took a step in the direction of regu- 
lation by abandoning traditional cost of service regulation of AT&T’s rates in 
favor of a simplified “rate cap” system. The new procedure gives AT&T more 
flexibility to meet competition and provides strong incentives for AT&T to 
reduce costs and increase productivity yet still provides safeguards against mo- 
nopoly abuses. The new procedure is a natural transition state to complete 
deregulation of long-distance rates sometime in the 1990s. 
Local Service 
An  important change in FCC policy during the 1980s has been to reduce 
substantially-and  eventually to  eliminate-the  subsidies of  local  service 
from overpricing long distance. While the new FCC policy has stopped the 
growth of  subsidies from long distance to local service and improved effi- 
ciency, in doing so it has put pressures on local prices (No11  1985). Table 6.7 
shows the average price to residential customers for unlimited local service 
during the past fifty years. Beginning in 1985, these figures also include the 
FCC’s subscriber line charge (SLC). Since divestiture, residential local service 
has increased $5.00 per month, or about 45 percent, about half of  which is 
SLC. In the five years prior to divestiture, local rates rose by about $3.40, an 
increase of 40 percent. This comparison, however, understates the effects of 
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Table 6.7  Charge for Unlimited Local Service (dollars) 
January 
1940  3.44 
1941  3.63 
1942  3.70 
1943  3.83 
1944  3.84 
1945  3.84 
1946  3.84 
1947  3.87 
1948  4.09 
1949  4.20 
1950  4.41 
1951  4.69 
1952  4.83 
1953  5.18 
1954  5.18 
January 
1955  5.29 
1956  5.34 
1957  5.37 
1958  5.44 
1959  5.60 
1960  5.64 
1961  5.70 
1962  5.71 
1963  5.75 
1964  5.76 
1965  5.78 
1966  5.77 
1967  5.71 
1968  5.72 
1969  5.79 
January 
1970  5.87 
1971  6.16 
1972  6.51 
1973  6.79 
1974  7.14 
1975  7.31 
1976  7.77 
1977  7.98 
1978  8.16 
1979  8.19 
1980  8.32 
1981  8.82 
1982  9.73 
1983  11.14 
October 
1983  11.58 
1984  13.35 
1985  14.54 
1986  16.13 
1987  16.66 
1988  16.59 
Source: Lande (1989, 16). 
Note:  Data exclude equipment rental but include estimates of state and local taxes. Data for 1983- 
88 do not include maintenance of  inside wiring. Data for  1940-83  (January) are from AT&T; 
remaining data are from FCC survey of ninety-five cities. 
interest rates, both of which can be expected to increase local telephone rates. 
As is apparent from the table, before the stagflation problems of the 1970s, 
local rates were highly stable. 
The prices in table 6.7 are averages over cities and states having very differ- 
ent price structures. Table 6.8 shows the trends in local service prices for busi- 
nesses and residences during the 1980s. These figures do not include the SLC 
but instead show the rates established by state regulators. As is apparent from 
the table, two major features of telephone pricing are the differences between 
rural and urban rates and the spread between business and residential rates. In 
1980, before either divestiture or long-distance competition had any substan- 
tial effect on the industry, residential rates in smaller communities were about 
two-thirds the prices charged in the large cities, while small town business 
rates were less than half the prices charged to big city businesses. During the 
postdivestiture era, these differences have fallen, especially the differences in 
business rates (for more details, see No11 and Smart 1990). 
Basic access prices bear little relation to the cost of service. The cost of local 
access service is extremely dependent on the size of the community. Nation- 
wide, the average monthly cost of  local exchange service is approximately 
$20.00; however, in large cities it is in the mid-teens, whereas in some rural 
areas it can approach $100 per month. The marginal cost of service is lower, 
with recent estimates varying from $10.00 to $13.00 in larger cities. 
Together, the price and cost data shed interesting light on the system of 
cross-subsidies in telephone sources. If the FCC’s subscriber line charges are Table 6.8  Rates for Single-Line Service: Average for all Companies (years) 
Divestiture 
Predives  titure  Plans  Postdivestiture  Change 
Size of Locality 











1  ,000,000 
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No. of companies 
14.33  15.23 
14.71  15.62 
16.33  17.26 
19.23  20.23 
20.97  22.14 
22.93  24.11 
25.29  26.96 
27.82  29.54 
27.91  29.20 
31.55  34.21 
17.22  18.98 
50  50 
6.49  6.69 
6.60  6.82 
7.05  7.25 
7.84  8.05 
8.26  8.54 
8.70  9.02 
9.38  9.72 
9.87  10.31 
9.74  10.02 
9.56  9.94 
3.07  3.25 




























































































































































































-  .41 
-.41 
-  .42 
-  .42 
-.57 
-1.04 
-  .60 
-.78 
-.53 
-  .74 
-1.01 
-  .60 
-  .25 
-  .25 
-  .25 
-  .28 
-.31 
-  .29 
-.32 
-  .39 
-  .35 
-.30 
-  .05 
Source: National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, Exchange  Service Telephone Rates, 1980-83, and Bell Operating 
Companies Exchange Service Telephone Rates, 1985-88. 423  Economic Regulation 
added to the figures in table 6.8, in cities with more than about 50,000 termi- 
nals  (about 100,000 people), residential customers pay  more than  $15.00, 
which exceeds the marginal cost and approaches the average cost. Meanwhile, 
businesses in these cities are paying $40.00 a month, which is approximately 
double the nationwide average cost and triple the marginal cost. Obviously, in 
large cities, business access is a major source of subsidy, and residential access 
is not subsidized significantly, if at all. In smaller towns and rural areas, resi- 
dential prices and probably business prices are well below average and mar- 
ginal cost. Clearly, small towns and rural areas are the primary recipients of 
the subsidy. Thus, the generalization  that long distance subsidizes local service 
is misleading. It would be more accurate to say that long-distance service and 
business access service in larger cities subsidize residential and business ac- 
cess in less populated areas. The cross-subsidy is targeted not at residences but 
at less densely populated areas. 
One important implication of these facts it that the “universal service”  justi- 
fication for price regulation is largely a hoax. Even in small towns, businesses 
do not need subsidies to be telephone subscribers, and subscribers in larger 
cities are not subsidized. In fact, cross-subsidization in telecommunications 
resembles the scheme in transportation before deregulation-subsidization  of 
small communities. Moreover, while the cross-subsidy in the telephone indus- 
try is reduced after the reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, it is still present. In 
contrast, deregulation of  trucks, rails, and airlines has, through competition, 
eliminated cross-subsidies. 
Productivity Growth and Cost Savings 
The former AT&T companies have been able to achieve enormous cost sav- 
ings and have demonstrated an extraordinarily  high rate of productivity growth 
since the divestiture in 1984. Despite substantial growth in the volume of busi- 
ness, aggregate employment among the former AT&T  subsidiaries has de- 
clined substantially. The pressures of competition and the removal of structural 
and regulatory distortions have led to cost savings far beyond what anyone had 
anticipated. This raises serious questions about whether AT&T was as efficient 
as many people used to think it was. 
Overall Results 
The overall consequences of  reforms in telecommunications regulation is 
difficult to assess by a single measure. Table 6.9 contains one relevant piece of 
information, the annual rates of change in prices for telephone services and a 
number of other items. The figures compare the past fifty years to the ten years 
after the Execunet decision, letting MCI into the message toll long-distance 
business. It is clearly difficult to detect any trend after 1978; telephones have 
always performed about 2 percent better than the CPI and continue to do so. 
Telephone prices also perform better than prices of other regulated utilities, 
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Table 6.9  Annual Rates of Change for Various Price Indexes (%) 
1935-88  1978-88 
CPI, all goods and services  4.2  6.1 
CPI, all services  4.6  7.5 
CPI, telephone services  2.2  4.3 
CPI, piped gas  3.8  7.1 
CPI, electricity  2.4  6.2 
Source: Industry Analysis Division (1989.4). 
tance of  fuel costs in the other industries rather than to some fundamental 
change in productivity treads. These figures do not include either customer 
equipment or new communications services that use the telecommunications 
network. Were these included, the performance of the sector since 1978 would 
be substantially better than the fifty-year trend. 
Table 6.10 contains more details about telecommunications pricing since 
1978. It clearly shows the divergence between local service and long-distance 
price trends.  It also reveals an interesting pattern between the CPI and the 
overall telephone price index. Telephones did much worse in the early 1980s 
than since 1986. The price increases in the early period reflect regulatory lag 
from the inflation of  1978-80;  by  1983, this adjustment was over. Then, for 
three years after divestiture, telecommunications prices rose more rapidly than 
the CPI. The most plausible explanation is the disrupting effect of divestiture 
and accommodating changes in price regulation. But, since 1987, the price 
performance in telecommunications has been far better. 
While difficult regulatory issues remain to be resolved and the transition to 
competition is not complete, as the data show, the telecommunications industry 
is more efficient, more flexible, and more competitive than it would have been 
without the dramatic and controversial changes of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
rough adjustment period apparently is largely over; the future holds promise 
for mounting benefits from these changes. Nevertheless, structure and prices 
in telecommunications are still issues engendering great political controversy. 
In the 1990s, as states attempt to assert more authority and the BOCs seek 
approval to reintegrate, further upheavals certainly cannot be ruled out. 
6.6  The Natural Gas Industry: A Saga of Rent Control” 
Natural gas price regulation can be understood only in the context of  the 
bizarre evolution of regulatory policy in this industry. Many of the industry’s 
problems were caused by federal regulation of  the price of natural gas in the 
field, which sought to capture scarcity rents associated with competitive gas 
17. With apologies to  Stephen Breyer (1982, chap. 13). See also Braeutigam  and  Hubbard 
(1986), Broadman and Montgomery (1983), and Lyon (1990). 425  Economic Regulation 
Table 6.10  Changes in Telephone Price Indexes, 1978-88  (%) 
All Telephone  All Local  Monthly Residential  Interstate  Intrastate 
Year  CPI  Services  Charges  Service  Toll  Toll 
1978  9.0  .9  1.4  3.1  -.8  1.3 
1979  13.3  .7  1.7  1.6  -  .7  .1 
1980  12.5  4.6  7.0  7.1  3.4  -  .6 
1981  8.9  11.7  12.6  15.6  14.6  6.2 
1982  3.8  7.2  10.8  9.0  2.6  4.2 
1983  3.8  3.6  3.1  .2  1.5  7.4 
1984  3.9  9.2  17.2  10.4  -4.3  3.6 
1985  3.8  4.7  8.9  12.4  -3.7  .6 
1986  1.1  2.7  7.1  8.9  -9.5  .3 
1987  4.4  -1.3  3.3  2.6  -  12.4  -3.0 
1988  4.4  1.3  4.5  4.5  -4.2  -4.2 
Source: Industry Analysis Division (1989, 5-7). 
supplies rather than to control monopoly or oligopoly pricing.’*  The structure 
and regulation of the natural gas industry, especially the changing regulatory 
environment, are complex. Figure 6.14 contains a diagram depicting the struc- 
ture of the industry and the relation between different segments. Figure 6.15 
contains a diagram depicting the regulatory environment. These figures will be 
useful in understanding the discussion that follows. 
Municipal and state regulation of  local gas distribution goes back to the 
mid-nineteenth century. The economic rationale for price and entry regulation 
of  gas distribution companies was (and is) that gas distribution is a natural 
monopoly and that costs could therefore be minimized if distribution services 
were provided by a single firm within a single geographic area. Price and entry 
regulation was regarded as necessary to promote reliability, safety, and least- 
cost supply and to prevent monopoly prices. 
Regulation of prices and entry into local gas distribution began prior to the 
development of large natural gas reserves and an extensive long-distance pipe- 
line network to move the gas from where it was found to where it was con- 
sumed. Originally, local gas distributors produced gas themselves from coal 
and coke. Because of its relatively high cost and low thermal content, manufac- 
tured gas was used primarily for lighting and cooking, although the lighting 
market was rapidly captured by electricity in the early part of  the twentieth 
century. 
In the 1920s, “waste” natural gas became available in conjunction with the 
growth of petroleum extraction, and technological progress made possible eco- 
nomical long-distance transportation of natural gas. These developments led 
18. Some gas is sure to be cheaper to extract than other gas. Hence, in a competitive world, the 
owner of cheap gas will make far higher profits than the owner of more expensive but economi- 
cally worthwhile gas. The higher profits in cheap gas are called scarcity rents. 426  Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. No11 
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Fig. 6.14  Principal buyer/seller transaction paths for natural gas marketing 
Source: US. Department of Energy (1989,2). 
to fundamental changes in the natural gas industry. Beginning in the 1930s, 
and accelerating after World  War  11,  cheap natural gas became available in 
many  cities remote from oil- and  gas-producing areas. Manufactured gas 
plants were closed, and the market for gas expanded rapidly as less costly 
natural gas was used for healing and as an industrial and electric utility boiler 
fuel. Local distributors relied on independent interstate pipelines to acquire 
gas and to transport it to them.19 
For over fifty years, interstate natural gas pipelines provided gas supplies 
and transportation services as a bundled product at a single price pursuant to 
long-term contracts between the gas distributor and the pipeline. Gas pipelines 
were not common carriers, and gas distributors did not purchase directly from 
gas producers. Gas pipelines purchased gas under long-term contract from gas 
producers to  fulfill their  obligations to  local  gas  distribution companies 
(LDCs). Federal regulation of interstate pipelines was introduced with the pas- 
sage of the Natural Gas Act of 1938.  The economic rationale for pipeline regu- 
lation was that pipelines had natural monopoly or oligopoly characteristics. 
The states sought federal regulation of interstate pipelines because state regu- 
lation of interstate pipeline charges was preempted by the commerce clause of 
the Constitution.  Most cities were and are served by a small number of pipeline 
companies, and, in the absence of price regulation, it was thought that pipelines 
would be in a position to charge monopoly prices for gas delivered to the city 
gate. The Natural Gas Act of 1938 gave the FPC (now the FERC) authority to 
regulate the price of  gas delivered by  interstate pipelines to gas distribution 
19. Although it has not been studied in any detail, we suspect that the combination of state laws 
regarding public utility corporations and restrictions provided for in the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of  1935 may have constrained the incentive and ability of  interstate gas pipelines to 
integrate forward into gas distribution. Pipeline regulation made integration of interstate gas pipe- 
lines upstream into gas production financially unattractive as well. 427  Economic Regulation 
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companies and direct service customers. The associated prices were based on 
both the average cost of gas purchased from producers and the average histori- 
cal cost of transporting it. Pipelines also took on a long-term obligation to 
provide gas supplies to local gas distributors at rates regulated by  the FPC. 
That is, the FPC forced the industry to rely on regulated long-term contracts 
between pipelines and local distributors. The FPC also endeavored to get the 
pipelines to secure long-term contracts for adequate supplies of  gas to meet 
the needs of downstream distributors. 
Prior to 1954,  natural gas production was not subject to price or entry regula- 
tion. The production of natural gas is a highly competitive industry, and there 
is no natural monopoly rationale for regulating the field price of natural gas. If 
market power is present in the relation between pipelines and gas producers, 
it is a monopsony problem. However, after World War 11, gas distributors and 
their state regulators sought to force the FPC to extend price regulation to gas 
producers. The distributors’ motivation for seeking the extension of  federal 
regulation to the price of natural gas purchased by  pipelines in the field had 
nothing to do with monopoly prices. Rather, it simply reflected the desire of 
distributors to extract a share of the scarcity rents associated with existing natu- 
ral gas reserves and the costs of  extracting gas from them. Much of  the gas 
being sold to interstate pipelines after World War I1 was developed in conjunc- 
tion with oil many years earlier. It was originally a “waste” product for which 
there was little demand and was sold at a very low price to consumers located 
close to gas-producing areas. As the demand for natural gas grew after World 
War  11,  field prices under new contracts soon began to rise significantly. In 428  Paul L. Joskow and Roger G. No11 
response to the demand for field price regulation, the FPC claimed that it 
lacked the statutory authority to regulate natural gas production. In 1954, in 
response to a lawsuit brought by  the state of  Wisconsin, the Supreme Court 
determined that the Natural Gas Act of  1938 required the FPC to regulate 
the prices that interstate pipelines paid for natural gas. Congress subsequently 
passed legislation exempting gas production from price regulation, but the bill 
was vetoed by President Eisenhower. 
Since the 1954 decision, the natural gas industry has been in almost contin- 
ual regulatory and political turmoil resulting largely from the efforts of  the 
FPC, the FERC, and later Congress to regulate the price of natural gas in the 
field.20  The FTC’s initial efforts to set prices on a producer-by-producer basis 
using conventional public utility cost of  service principles quickly became a 
regulatory morass (Breyer 1982, 248-50).  In the 1960s, the FTC began to set 
ceiling prices for “old” gas and “new” gas in each of  five producing areas, 
based on the average cost of finding and producing natural gas discovered at 
different times in each area (Breyer 1982, 250-52). 
Areawide field prices that were too low combined with average cost pricing 
for gas delivered to distributors (the average cost of gas purchased by a pipeline 
pursuant to all its contracts) led to severe supply shortages first in the market 
for new gas reserves in the late 1960s and then in the market for flowing gas 
beginning in the early 1970s (Breyer 1982,244-47).  This in turn led to a com- 
plex set of  rules to allocate the shortages among different customer classes, 
with existing residential customers getting the highest priority and industrial 
and utility customers who could switch to oil getting the lowest priority. Dislo- 
cations in world oil markets in the mid-1970s made the growing shortages of 
natural gas even worse. Oil and gas are close substitutes in many end uses. As 
the price of  oil rose, the demand for natural gas increased, and the price of 
natural gas in unregulated intrastate markets rose along with the price of oil. 
Although the FPC increased natural gas prices in 1974, in 1976 the price of 
intrastate gas was twice the price of  interstate gas (Carpenter, Jacoby, and 
Write 1987). 
Policymakers faced a classic regulatory dilemma during the  1970s. The 
price of natural gas sold in interstate markets was being held far below market 
clearing levels. Since the historical average cost of  natural gas, the foundation 
for FPC field price regulatory policy, had not risen with market values, tradi- 
tional rate-making methods could not possibly yield market clearing prices. 
The large unregulated intrastate market caused producers to bypass the inter- 
state market to supply gas where the price was highest, making the shortages 
in the interstate market even worse. Deregulation of field prices was an obvious 
20. Until 1979, natural gas that was produced and sold to an intrastate pipeline for resale within 
the same state was exempt from federal regulation. Separate intrastate markets emerged in Texas 
and Louisiana. Field prices for intrastate natural gas eventually climbed far above field prices for 
natural gas dedicated to interstate pipelines. Shortages did not develop in the  intrastate markets. 429  Economic Regulation 
alternative; however, deregulation would transfer an enormous amount of  in- 
come from consumers and consuming regions of the nation to producers and 
producing regions. Although the “natural gas problem” was hotly debated in 
Congress during the 1970s, regulators spent most of the decade trying to allo- 
cate gas shortages. 
Soon after President Carter was elected, his administration sought to have 
new, comprehensive energy legislation passed by Congress. The proposed Na- 
tional Energy Act eventually was broken into several different parts dealing 
individually  with oil, natural gas pricing, natural gas allocations, electric utility 
regulation, conservation, and research and development. After bitter debate, 
Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in late 1978 (the intense 
lobbying over the NGPA was well captured in a piece produced by PBS soon 
afterward). The NGPA was designed to provide for a transition from relatively 
low regulated prices to higher market clearing prices by moderating the short- 
run impact of higher prices on natural gas consumers. A companion piece of 
legislation (the Fuel Use Act) sought to erase the allocation problem by  re- 
stricting the use of natural gas to generate electricity and as a boiler fuel in 
industry, which it was argued involved “inefficient” uses for natural gas. 
The NGPA sought to achieve its objectives by extending federal regulation 
of  field prices to intrastate natural gas and by  establishing a complex set of 
rules for determining the prices of different “vintages” of natural gas. The base 
price of  “old” gas (reserves from which gas was flowing before April 1977) 
was fixed at prevailing levels, with automatic adjustments in the base price for 
inflation as measured by  the GNP deflator. The price of  “new” gas was set 
higher, but below what was then thought to be the market clearing level. The 
legislation contained adjustment provisions that allowed the ceiling price for 
new gas to increase gradually to the projected market clearing price in 1985. 
The latter was based primarily on projections of the price of oil (the 1985 gas 
price target was based on the assumption that, in  1985, the price of oil would 
be $15.00 per barrel in 1979 dollars). “New” gas prices were scheduled to be 
deregulated in  1985 as they reached projected market clearing levels, while 
certain categories of “high-cost’’ gas were deregulated immediately. 
The result of these regulations was that, by  1981, gas in the field was selling 
at anywhere between $1  .OO and $1 1  .OO per thousand cubic feet, depending on 
the regulatory category into which it fell. Each pipeline held a portfolio of 
contracts, each of  which carried different prices. Pipelines sold gas to local 
distribution companies and direct service customers at the average price of the 
gas associated with this portfolio of contracts. 
The NGPA also contained provisions that explicitly allowed the FERC (the 
successor agency to the FPC) to authorize interstate pipelines to provide un- 
bundled transportation service to transport gas owned by  intrastate pipelines 
or local distribution companies. The intent of this legislation appears to have 
been to provide a mechanism for distributors to acquire gas in the intrastate 
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had traditionally sold gas and transportation service bundled together, the FPC 
had approved some transportation-only service for selected high-priority cus- 
tomers whose gas supplies in the interstate market had been curtailed. This 
section of the NGPA appears to have been inserted to provide a limited mecha- 
nism to help the FERC deal with shortages affecting certain priority users. 
President Carter barely had time to sign the NGPA when the Iranian revolu- 
tion led to another major dislocation in world oil markets. The average refiner 
acquisition cost of crude oil rose from $12.50 in  1978 to $35.00 in  1981. Oil 
prices once again rose dramatically relative to the price of natural gas specified 
in the NGPA (fig. 6.16). Almost as soon as it was written, the assumptions on 
which the NGPA’s  natural gas price adjustment provisions were based became 
invalid as market conditions changed dramatically. In particular, it appeared 
that gas prices would be too low through 1985 and then “fly up” to market 
clearing levels as “new” gas supplies were deregulated. 
The unification of the interstate and intrastate markets made it possible for 
interstate pipelines to acquire gas reserves again. However, because the NGPA 
had fixed prices at what appeared to be levels below their market clearing val- 
ues (at least until 1985),  gas pipelines engaged in intense nonprice competition 
for gas by offering to contract for gas supplies pursuant to terms and conditions 
that had very favorable provisions from the producers’ perspective. In particu- 
lar, gas pipelines signed long-term contracts with very high (80-95  percent) 
minimum take or pay provisions. These contracts were based on projections of 
growing natural gas demand and rising prices and caused pipelines to bear the 
risks of changes in natural gas prices after 1985. It didn’t seem to occur to the 
pipelines or policymakers that not all the contracted gas could be sold. After 
all, for thirty-five years, the major problem that gas pipelines faced was getting 
enough gas supplies to meet the needs of their customers. 
After the initial run-up in oil prices in  1979-81,  two events disrupted the 
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Fig. 6.16  Gas vs. oil prices 
Source: US.  Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review (various issues). 431  Economic Regulation 
institutional arrangements induced by the NGPA. First, oil prices began to de- 
cline after 1981. At first, the decline was gradual, but, in  1986, the oil market 
collapsed (see fig. 6.16). Second, the economy experienced a severe recession 
in  1981-83.  The recession was particularly severe in some industrial sectors 
that  consumed significant quantities of  natural gas (e.g., steel and autos). 
Moreover, structural changes in the economy that were accelerated by the re- 
cession had a permanent adverse impact on these sectors, resulting in a perma- 
nent reduction in natural gas demand. Natural gas consumption fell by nearly 
20 percent between 1980 and 1983. 
Of  course, as these changes took place, NGPA field price regulations and 
long-term contracts between gas producers and pipelines kept operating. As 
oil prices fell, gas prices rose (see fig. 6.16), and natural gas consumption fell. 
The long-term take or pay contracts became increasingly onerous to the pipe- 
lines as the rising regulatedcontract prices and minimum take obligations re- 
inforced one another. If  gas pipelines could not sell all the gas they had con- 
tracted for, they tried to pass along the full cost of minimum take obligations 
as higher prices to local gas distributors. Local distributors also had minimum 
bill contracts with pipelines and tried to pass the price increases along to retail 
customers. Furthermore, since gas pipelines could not sell all the gas they had 
contracted for, a surplus of  natural gas began to emerge by  1983, and field 
production was curtailed. Spot gas was available in the field at prices substan- 
tially less than the prices pipelines were paying in long-term contracts and 
passing along to consumers. In a few short years, a serious gas shortage had 
been transformed into a serious gas glut. 
Gas pipelines faced a serious problem. They had contracted for gas that they 
could not sell at uniform regulated prices that would allow them to recover the 
costs of a1 their contractual obligations. As oil prices collapsed after 1985, the 
retention of their largest price-sensitive customers with fuel-switching  capabil- 
ities became increasingly difficult. Pipelines faced three choices. They could 
swallow tens of billions of dollars in excess take or pay liabilities and continue 
to market and price gas according to prevailing regulatory procedures, recov- 
ering as much as they could from their LDC and direct service customers on 
the basis of  prices determined by  traditional average cost pricing principles. 
They could breach their contracts with producers, trying to prevail in court on 
the basis of the force majeure provisions in contracts, or ultimately to renegoti- 
ate the contracts. They could try to sell more gas by offering lower prices for 
gas to new customers and to price-sensitive old customers who would other- 
wise switch to oil while continuing to charge captive customers higher rates. 
The pipelines initially tried to do a little of each. First, pipelines sought to 
pass as much of their purchased power costs on to local distributors as they 
could; however, local distributors also served price-sensitive customers and 
had to deal with state regulators who pressured them to minimize their mini- 
mum bill obligations. They resisted paying for take or pay liabilities associated 
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pipeline rate proceedings at the FERC. Gas pipelines also began to breach 
some contracts and to insist on renegotiating others. Finally, gas pipelines be- 
gan to utilize new marketing methods to obtain new customers and retain ex- 
isting customers who might otherwise have switched to oil. 
Of particular interest was the decision of some pipelines to offer brokering 
packages through which they would acquire specific quantities of low-priced 
spot gas in the field for specific LDC or direct service customers and then 
transport it to them using an unbundled transportation rate. The brokered gas 
could be gas that the pipeline would otherwise be obligated to take under its 
contracts with producers. By limiting these special marketing programs to new 
customers and customers with fuel switching capabilities, the pipelines could 
sell more gas at smaller margins without cutting into the revenues that they 
were able to earn from captive customers. In short, they engaged in classic 
third-degree price discrimination. 
This “unbundling” response by  some pipelines to the economic crisis re- 
sulting from historical regulatory rules, contractual arrangements, and chang- 
ing economic conditions ultimately led to profound changes in the way natural 
gas is contracted for in the field and transported by pipelines. While the provi- 
sion of unbundled transportation service had once been an exception, used in 
special cases to cope with shortages, it is now the norm. Local distributors and 
direct service customers now routinely contract directly with producers for a 
significant fraction of their gas, relying on pipelines for unbundled transporta- 
tion service to move this gas. However, LDCs continue to rely on pipelines 
for traditional bundled gas supplies for a significant fraction of  their needs, 
especially during the winter when spot gas supplies are more costly and less re- 
liable. 
The FERC initially supported the pipeline’s efforts to increase gas sales by 
using unbundled transportation arrangements  to engage in price discrimination 
and welcomed the associated net revenues that could be applied to their fixed 
costs, thereby reducing costs attributable to captive or core customers (FERC 
Orders 319 and 234-B). The resulting price and access discrimination was jus- 
tified as providing benefits to captive customers who might otherwise be stuck 
with paying for the pipeline’s fixed costs. Then, in 1985, the D.C. Circuit held 
that these programs were illegal under the statutes governing the FERC’s regu- 
lation of natural gas pipelines. The rejection of the new program came just as 
the world oil market was collapsing, reducing further the maximum prices that 
pipelines could profitably charge for gas on standard tariffs. While average 
field prices had begun to decline by 1985  in response to contract renegotiations 
and deregulation of new gas prices in 1985, they did not fall nearly as much as 
the price of  oil (see fig. 6.16). Furthermore, responding to complaints from 
local gas distributors, in 1984 the FERC eliminated gas costs from minimum 
bills in pipeline tariffs (Order 380), reducing the exposure of local distribution 
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pipelines. These developments provided further incentives for pipelines to 
breach their contracts with producers. 
In 1985, the FERC recognized that it needed to implement a more affirma- 
tive policy to resolve the contractual crisis in the industry and to cope with the 
inefficiencies caused by  regulated pipeline prices that greatly exceeded the 
price of spot gas in the field and that distorted gas production decisions. The 
FERC used the crisis to “encourage” the gas pipeline industry permanently to 
change the way  it does business. Specifically, the FERC began to pursue a 
long-term policy of requiring pipelines to provide open nondiscriminatory un- 
bundled transportation service for gas purchased in the field by distributor and 
end-use customers in competition with one another and with pipelines (Order 
436 and Order 500). While providing transportation to all on a nondiscrimina- 
tory basis is technically voluntary, the FERC provided a substantial incentive 
to participate by discouraging contract carriage certificates that are not tied to 
open access rules and by trying to tie the resolution of the rate-making treat- 
ment of  pipeline take or pay  liabilities to participation in the general open 
access regulations. 
Because pipelines needed to find alternative ways  of  marketing gas, and 
because the FERC channeled these needs to create a common carrier gas trans- 
portation  system, virtually  all major  interstate pipelines now  provide un- 
bundled transportation service. The proportion of the gas transported by pipe- 
lines  that  is  owned by  third  parties purchasing  unbundled  transportation 
service has grown enormously and by  1990 accounted for roughly 70 percent 
of the gas moved by interstate pipelines (see figs. 6.17 and 6.18). By purchas- 
Fig. 6.17  Transportation to market vs. system sales 
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Fig. 6.18  Percentage of gas delivered by twenty major interstate pipeline 
companies to LDCs and end users in transportation programs, by major market 
area, 1982-87 
Source: US.  Department of Energy (1989,45). 
ing gas directly from producers or through gas brokers, local gas distributors 
and large customers have kept their gas costs lower than if  they had to buy 
exclusively from pipelines based on standard tariffs. Most contractual disputes 
between gas producers and gas pipelines have been resolved (just as oil prices 
rose significantly again!), and the demand for gas, especially to generate elec- 
tricity, is increasing. In 1990, the field price of over 90 percent of the gas pro- 
duced in the United States was either unregulated or below regulated ceiling 
prices. Amendments to the NGPA passed in  1989 remove all remaining field 
price regulations in 1993. 
Not all the regulatory problems that plague the natural gas industry have 
been solved (Teece 1990). The FERC has created a regulatory environment in 
which pipelines have an ambiguous obligation to provide both transportation 
service and bundled gas service. The appropriate rates and contractual obliga- 
tions to place on buyers consistent with these pipeline obligations have still 
not been fully resolved. Furthermore, enthusiasm for unbundled transportation 
services must in part reflect the abundant supply of low-priced spot gas that 
was available after 1985. As supplies tighten, spot prices are likely to rise and 
to become more volatile. Those who choose to rely too much on spot purchases 
may someday learn to regret it (Teece 1990)-and  will probably seek new field 
price regulations actively. Nevertheless, the primary cause of the natural gas 
mess, field price regulation, is now almost gone. Let us hope that we do not 
try it again. 435  Economic Regulation 
6.7  The Causes of Reform 
The preceding review should leave the reader convinced that no simple ex- 
planation accounts for the reforms in economic regulation that took place after 
1975. Nonetheless, some general forces appear to be at work. 
The prior wave of regulatory reform occurred in the 1930s, a period of great 
economic turmoil. Whereas the 1970s and 1980s were hardly as tumultuous as 
the 1930s, in comparison with the first twenty-five years after World War I1 
they were certainly no picnic either. The economy generally performed poorly 
during most of the past two decades, and this gave added salience to proposals 
that could improve efficiency by a politically visible amount. In the immortal 
words of Everett Dirksen, “a billion dollars here and a billion dollars there, 
pretty soon you are talking real money.” 
Nonetheless, economic hardship alone would not have been sufficient had 
regulation been working reasonably well. Here the academic scholars deserve 
a role in the story. The numerous studies of economic regulatory policies, 
along with the cynical interpretation of them that emerged as the economist’s 
political theory of regulation, could hardly have escaped official Washington. 
The real message of this work was that the market failure rationale for eco- 
nomic regulation had been vastly oversold across the board. In no case could 
one categorically state that the natural monopoly clearly encompassed all fac- 
ets of a regulated industry. And one could readily show that attempts to regu- 
late markets having little or no natural monopoly characteristics were costly. 
But, we might ask, so what? Why did protected erstwhile competitors fail 
to defend their turf? Is interest group theory dead? Obviously not-the  savings 
and loan debacle is testimony to the proposition that the special interest view 
of regulation is not devoid of merit. And, if we look more deeply, in no case 
did regulatory reform occur with no significant organized support. The rail- 
roads had wanted to be less regulated since the 1950s. They were successfully 
opposed by competing modes until the industry essentially went belly up. Be- 
cause railroads really are an extremely efficient and important means of trans- 
porting many types of goods, it would have been cosmically foolish to let them 
disappear. So the truckers lost-and,  while Congress was at work, it deregu- 
lated the truckers as well. 
In telecommunications,  AT&T can blind us by its predivestiture size. Surely, 
AT&T did not want either divestiture or deregulation. But, since the invention 
of the telephone in  1876, AT&T has not been the only significant player in 
telecommunications, and its structure has always been controversial. Even so, 
technology probably forced the issue. Hughes Aircraft, not AT&T, invented 
the geosynchronous satellite; immediately thereafter, AT&T was frozen out 
of satellite communications for more than a decade. Numerous players in the 
electronics industry (radio, computers, semiconductors)  also produced techno- 
logies that made use of communications-and  they sought part of the action. 
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low that large-scale users sacrificed very little in unit costs by abandoning the 
scale economies of  the public network and going it alone. MCI, of  course, 
was a peanut company, an unlikely candidate to overcome AT&T. But much 
groundwork had already been laid by much larger companies in bringing about 
Above 890 and “open skies” in satellites. 
Airlines pose a difficult case. Until the very end, when the die was cast, no 
major carrier wanted deregulation, nor did any other organized interest. Air- 
craft manufacturers have been a major beneficiary of deregulation, but they 
played no role in the deregulation debate. Here the most plausible explanation 
is political entrepreneurship by  Senator Kennedy and then-president Carter. 
We find no plausible interest group account of their advocacy of deregulation 
or of Carter’s great care in seeking out CAB appointees who would carry out 
the deed. In choosing between political entrepreneurship and the force of eco- 
nomic ideas, we  simply cannot bring ourselves to choose the latter because 
ideas did not work elsewhere in the same period. 
The general economic troubles of the 1970s were especially centered in the 
energy sector. Here the case that regulatory reform might actually address the 
economic  problems  associated  with  stagflation-the  part  associated  with 
wildly fluctuating energy prices-was  not the stretch that it was in the other 
regulated industries. In the late 1970s,  Congress and the president believed that 
their political futures were at stake in doing something about energy. Gradual 
natural gas deregulation was surely a plausible move-deregulation  because 
the  economic  disruption  of  the  oil  crisis  had  been  exacerbated  by  the 
regulation-induced gas shortage, gradual because politicians naturally sought 
to avoid cataclysmic disruptions, even if gradualism is itself costly. Note that, 
a decade later, gradualism was also pursued in rationalizing telephone pricing. 
In sum, our account is forced to give some role to almost all the theories 
discussed in section 6.1. Economics research seems to have played a role in 
most, but not all (i.e.,  telecommunications), of the reforms that we have re- 
viewed. In most cases, some organized interests favored reform, but there are 
exceptions here as well (airlines and trucks). More important, the biggest inter- 
ests rarely won. A minimal degree of organized support may be necessary, but, 
once the game has strong players on both sides, the winner does not usually 
seem to be the one that ought to have the most clout. Maybe this is when ideas 
matter. Indeed, while normative principles of efficiency are not sufficient for 
reform, they seem to have influenced the form that reform took once a policy 
change was at hand. Whereas the ultimate result was never the first-best solu- 
tion from the economics textbooks, in every case economics had an important 
role in structuring the reform. Yet, in every case, the desire to avoid disruptive 
change and to protect some identifiable interest constrained the design of the 
reform in ways that reduced economic efficiency. 
Certainly, the main question in the 1990s is whether these reforms are here 
to stay. Were it the case that they were largely the result of  Reaganism, we 
would be skeptical of  their durability, for Reaganism did not really survive 437  Economic Regulation 
even into Ronald Reagan’s second term. But relaxation of economic regulation 
was not a Reagan reform, although parts of it were surely broadly in step with 
Reagan ideology and the Reagan administration  aggressively pursued the regu- 
latory liberalization reforms that began in the late 1970s. If anything,  however, 
the Reagan administration reduced the chance that these reforms would en- 
dure: by refusing to let FAA programs expand in pace with airline growth after 
deregulation, by permitting several anticompetitive  airline mergers, by failing 
to stop the banking debacle when the cost was still in the tens of billions, by 
allowing federal devolution to have priority over regulatory reform and so to 
be too deferential to states that seek to increase regulation (insurance, telecom- 
munications),  and by generally ignoring economic regulatory issues in the sec- 
ond term. The cost is likely to be increased regulation of an undesirable form 
in banking (rather than more rigorous financial scrutiny) and perhaps even a 
return to airline regulation. Nonetheless, most of the changes since 1975 seem 
to have proceeded too far and created too many interests to protect them to 
make reversal plausible. For the most part, these policy changes did improve 
the performance of regulated industries and did make consumers better off in 
ways that are clearly visible. In this sense, the “ideas” account again has some 
force. Relaxation of economic regulation was a good idea, and in most cases 
it has worked reasonably well. 
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2.  William  A. Niskanen 
One of the four “key elements” of Reagan’s program of economic recovery was 
“a far-reaching program of regulatory relief.” Despite that initial commitment, 
the Reagan administration made few proposals for new deregulatory legisla- 
tion, and it did not manage the deregulation that had been previously approved 
especially well. My  remarks today summarize the reasons for this outcome 
and, consistent with the structure of this conference, focus on the traditional 
subjects of economic regulation-leaving  others to address the interesting is- 
sues involving the regulation of financial institutions; health, safety, and the 
environment; antitrust; and trade.’ 
Policies and People 
The initial and continuing focus of  the Reagan regulatory program was re- 
lief, not reform. In his December 1980 “economic Dunkirk” memo, David 
Stockman summarized the rationale for this approach: “A dramatic, substantial 
recession of the regulatory burden is needed for the short term cash flow it will 
provide to business firms and [for] the long term signal that it will provide to 
corporate investment planners. A major  ‘regulatory ventilation’ will do as 
much to boost business confidence as tax  or fiscal measures.”z Most of  this 
regulatory relief was to be accomplished by administrative rulings rather than 
by new legislation. 
The new administration moved quickly to implement this approach during 
its first month in office. A Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by Vice 
President George Bush, was established to provide general policy guidance. A 
large number of pending regulations were suspended for sixty days to permit 
review by the new administration, and the remaining price controls on oil and 
Carter’s voluntary price and wage controls were terminated. The regulatory 
review was centralized under the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA), which was part of  the Office of  Management and Budget (OMB). 
The most important of these initial measures was a new executive order that 
instructed the executive agencies, to the extent permitted by  law, to use the 
maximum net benefit criterion to choose among regulatory options. This exec- 
utive order also established a special procedure for major regulations and au- 
thorized the OIRA to review all proposed rules prior to their publication in the 
Federal Registel: 
Most of the new appointees to regulatory positions had a strong commitment 
to  deregulation. Two  economists  who  had  designed  the  initial  regulatory 
agenda were soon appointed to key positions-Murray  Weidenbaum as chair- 
1. For obvious reasons, most of this summary is taken from Niskanen (1988, 115-54). 
2. The “economic Dunkirk” memo is reproduced in Greider (1982, 137-59). 442  William A. Niskanen 
man of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and James Miller as head of 
the OIRA. The most important other initial appointments included William 
Baxter as assistant attorney general for antitrust and Mark Fowler as chairman 
of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Many of the subsequent 
appointments also reaffirmed this commitment. I and Tom Moore each served 
four years as the microeconomic member of the CEA. Miller’s successors as 
head of the OIRA were Chris DeMuth, Douglas Ginsburg, and Wendy Gramm. 
Miller later served as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission and Ginsburg 
as assistant attorney general for antitrust. The later appointment of  Heather 
Gradison as chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission proved im- 
portant to forestall pressures to reregulate railroads and trucking. For the most 
part, the disappointing regulatory record of the Reagan administration cannot 
be blamed on a lack of skills or commitment on the part of those with the most 
direct responsibility. 
The Record of Economic Regulation 
patterns of the Reagan record. 
Agriculture 
Two  early reviews of  agricultural marketing orders were aborted without 
substantial change. In 1979, a consumer group had innocently asked the De- 
partment of Agriculture to review the federal milk marketing orders. In April 
1981, however, the department denied this request on the basis of  estimates 
that a more efficient distribution of milk production would increase the federal 
budget costs of  supporting milk prices. A major review of the broader set of 
marketing orders led to a preliminary 1982 decision to eliminate the restric- 
tions on entry and to increase substantially the limits on the rules of  fresh 
products. A storm of protest from California citrus growers, however, led the 
administration  to modify the final 1983 guidelines, which phased out the entry 
restrictions on two small crops and only slightly increased the sales limits on 
the major crops. Congress locked up this decision by one of the first of many 
new “muzzling laws” that prohibited any further expenditure of funds to study 
this issue. 
Communications 
The major changes in the regulation of communications were the result of 
forceful early initiatives by two individuals, Mark Fowler and Bill Baxter. In 
198  1, the FCC deregulated most radio broadcasting restrictions, implemented 
a simplified system for renewing radio licenses, and induced Congress to ex- 
tend the license period for both radio and television stations and to authorize a 
lottery system for the award of new licenses. The later record, however, was 
mixed. A 1983 initiative to relax the “financial interest and syndication rules,” 
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which restrict the right of television networks to develop original programming 
and to syndicate reruns, was stopped by  “the California mafia” in the White 
House responding to pressures from Hollywood. In 1984, Congress approved 
the full deregulation of cable rates but did not approve any new entry into the 
monopoly cable markets. After the sharp subsequent increase in cable rates, 
Congress may  soon compound this error by  reregulating cable rates, again 
without permitting new entry. And the major missed opportunity was the fail- 
ure to change the system for allocating the electronic frequency spectrum, a 
system that corresponds roughly to the way the Soviets run their economy. As 
a consequence, some new technologies have been delayed even though large 
parts of the spectrum are underutilized. 
The major change in communications regulation was the result of Baxter’s 
January  1982 resolution of  the long-standing antitrust case against AT&T. 
Under the threat of a court decision imposing a divestiture plan, Baxter and 
AT&T worked out a plan, effective in 1984, that allowed AT&T to maintain 
its long-distance services, its unregulated communications services, and its 
manufacturing company but required it to divest its twenty-two local operating 
companies. As expected, this decision led to a substantial reduction in long- 
distance rates and a substantial increase in the (state-regulated) local rates. 
This decision was not broadly popular, and Congress considered more than a 
dozen bills to stop or limit the increase in subscriber charges. After a consider- 
able amount of populist posturing, Congress forced the FCC to delay the ac- 
cess charge ruling but did not reverse this basic change in the structure of the 
telecommunications service industry. 
Energy 
After the important early decision to terminate the price controls on oil, the 
administration’s later record on energy regulation was disappointing.  A simple 
bill to deregulate the wellhead prices of natural gas was approved by the cabi- 
net council in 1982 but was deferred by the White House as part of a general 
strategy of avoiding any more controversial issues prior to the election. A more 
complicated 1983 proposal by the Department of Energy received no support 
in Congress. The reaction by  both the White House and Congress was based 
on  a broadly shared but incorrect expectation that decontrol of  natural gas 
would have increased retail gas  price^.^ In the end, the Federal Energy Regula- 
tory Commission effectively decontrolled gas prices by setting price caps that, 
until this summer, were above market prices. And, in 1988, Congress quietly 
terminated the Fuel Use Act, which had restricted the use of oil and natural 
gas in new power plants. The administration also equivocated on other energy 
issues. For example, the required corporate average fuel economy on new cars 
was administratively reduced by  one mile per gallon, but the administration 
3. For my  own analysis of  the effects of controls on the wellhead prices of  natural  gas, see 
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would not propose the termination of this absurd law; Congress is now consid- 
ering a large proportionate increase in the required fuel economy-a  measure 
that, not incidentally, would be biased against Japanese cars. 
Labor 
The Department of Labor made several administrative changes in the regula- 
tions affecting work under federal construction contracts and on work at home 
but would not propose a change in the laws authorizing these regulations. The 
only major legislative proposal was to authorize a lower minimum wage for 
teenage summer employment, a proposal that was strongly rejected by  Con- 
gress. 
Transportation 
The Reagan administration and Congress made only small changes to ex- 
tend or complement the major transportation deregulation measures instituted 
during the Carter administration. In  1982, the administration concluded an 
agreement with the major European nations to permit greater flexibility in the 
fares on transatlantic flights. Also in 1982, Congress approved the full deregu- 
lation of  intercity bus travel-a  measure that provoked little controversy be- 
cause there never was a basis for regulating that industry and the demand for 
bus service had slowly declined in response to rising income and airline dereg- 
ulation. And, in  1984, Congress approved the Shipping Act to enable ocean 
shipping companies to offer lower rates and better services than permitted by 
the shipping conferences. The administration’s proposal to terminate the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission on its centennial in 1987, however, fell on deaf 
ears, and the ICC still maintains considerable authority that could be used to 
reregulate trucking and the railroads. 
The major missed opportunity was the failure to reform, expand, or privatize 
the airports and airways systems in response to the large increase in commer- 
cial flights induced by  airline deregulation. For example, the number of  air 
traffic controllers is now about the same as before the 1981 strike, and the 
system for allocating landing slots at congested airports has yet to be rational- 
ized as no new  major airport has been built for fifteen years. In late 1985, 
after several years of pressure from the OIRA and the CEA, the Department of 
Transportation approved the resale of landing slots at the four most crowded 
airports, but this action was later challenged by Congress. In 1988, the depart- 
ment even overruled an increase in landing fees on light aircraft using Logan 
Airport. And the administration  showed no interest in several proposals to sub- 
contract or privatize parts of the airports and airways systems. The failure to 
follow airline deregulation with complementary changes in the airports and 
airways system is the primary reason for the increased airport congestion and 
airline delays and the background rumbles, primarily from business travelers, 
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Patterns and Lessons 
The major pattern of  the Reagan record on economic regulation was the 
attempt to rely primarily on administrative deregulation and the reluctance to 
propose changes in legislation that would extend or lock in prior deregulation. 
The primary reason for this pattern is that regulatory relief was clearly the 
lowest priority of the four key elements of the Reagan economic program. This 
should not be surprising. The other key elements were more ambitious and 
promised clearer benefits. Deregulation usually leads to diffused benefits and 
concentrated costs. Some types of  deregulation were checked by  campaign 
commitments that Reagan had made to the construction, trucking, and mari- 
time unions and by  business interests, especially in California, to which the 
administration was responsive. 
The major lesson from this record is that the potential for administrative 
deregulation is quite limited. The able people who led the OIRA probably 
pushed the White House regulatory review process as much as possible, given 
the limited change in regulatory legislation. Their aggressive actions to review, 
modify, or delay regulatory proposals initiated by the executive agencies, how- 
ever, were ultimately checked by  both Congress and the courts. On several 
occasions, Congress threatened to constrain the authority of  the OIRA or to 
eliminate its funding, a controversy that has not yet been resolved. (For ex- 
ample, the position of the head of the OIRA has not been filled for over a year, 
and Congress is again bargaining with the administration over measures that 
would reduce the authority of the OIRA.) A more explicit construct was the 
application of  a “hard look” doctrine by  the federal court of  appeals for the 
District  of  Columbia to  proposals for  both  regulation  and  deregulation. 
The primary effect of this doctrine is to require a more explicit rationale, based 
on the criteria in the regulatory legislation, for regulatory changes of any kind. 
This role of the courts, a position generally endorsed by the Reagan adminis- 
tration, increases the importance of changing the regulatory legislation if the 
momentum for deregulation is to be revived. 
Another lesson is that budget policy sometime got in the way of good regula- 
tory policy. This was first apparent when David Stockman agreed to the egre- 
gious sugar program in exchange for a few votes on the fiscal year 1982 budget. 
Our budget accounting conventions are also a problem. Since user fees are 
treated as an offsetting receipt, for example, both the deposit insurance funds 
and the airports and airways fund showed negative net outlays for most of the 
Reagan years, despite a rapid increase in liabilities and investment backlogs. 
The objective of any budget director to limit measured budget outlays was part 
of  the reason why  the administration was  slow to address both the deposit 
insurance disaster and the increased airline delays. The major current threat of 
mandated benefits of several kinds, in turn, is primarily a consequence of the 
perception that it is difficult to expand the welfare state through the federal 446  Elizabeth Bailey 
fisc. We  still need a system that forces a review of the costs of proposed and 
recurring federal actions of all kinds. 
For all these problems, the Reagan regulatory record was probably better 
than average. The total costs of regulation, as measured by  several indirect 
indices, increased at a slower rate than at any time since the 1950s. For those 
of us who were directly involved, however, this record was very disappointing. 
Some mistakes and, more important, the missed opportunities failed to sustain 
the momentum for deregulation initiated in the 1970s and set the stage for 
what portends to be a regulatory explosion in the 1990s. 
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3. Elizabeth Bailey 
I agree that much of the momentum for deregulation was set in the 1970s. But 
I am more upbeat than Bill Niskanen because I see a lot of progress in the 
evolution of decontrol policies during the 1980s. The airline industry went the 
farthest. Its regulatory agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), was fully 
dismantled in the 1980s. This was a major achievement. 
Moreover, a number of effective policies for dismantling economic regula- 
tion were designed in the  1980s for trucks and rail. True, their regulatory 
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, continues to exist. But the ac- 
tual fact, I think, is that most goods are now moving largely by contract and 
therefore largely outside the regulatory web. 
For other industries, like electric utilities, gas pipelines, and telecommunica- 
tions, the 1980s ushered in what economist Alfred Kahn calls a “half regulated, 
half free” system. Yet, even here, I see evolution. I see some coherent direction 
in the design of decontrol policy. 
While I agree with Paul Joskow and Roger No11 that policy implementation 
across industries has been imperfect and sometimes reflects political (rather 
than economic) influence, nevertheless I see more of a unifying policy theme 
than they do. Moreover, the theme relates very much to economic ideas. De- 447  Economic Regulation 
control policies of the 1980s have been influenced by the ideas, not of defunct 
economists, but of economists who are living today and who have participated 
as deregulators and as witnesses before Congress and the courts. 
Public intervention is still undertaken. But, now, the preference is to seek 
policies that move in  the direction of  the market economy, of  competition. 
Policies are designed to promote actual and potential competition instead of to 
preclude it by  preventing entry. The focus is now  on figuring out in a much 
more systematic way how markets can be successful. 
Alfred Kahn recently expressed a similar view about the evolution of regula- 
tory policy. He says that evolution “is the path not of a full circle or pendulum 
which would take us back to where we started,” as was discussed by  Charls 
Walker this morning with tax policy. Instead, the path is that “of a spiral, which 
has a direction. That direction is an expression of  a preference for seeking 
consistently to move in the direction of the first-best functioning of a market 
economy, rather than the second- or third-best world of centralized command 
and control” (Kahn 1990,353-54). 
Let me go back in history a little bit and outline how this shift of people’s 
attitudes from detailed regulation to a preference for market freedom took 
place. When economic regulation was first designed in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury, both transportation and communications  were inconvenient and costly. So 
it made economic sense to encourage industry-wide natural monopolies and 
oligopolies to promote efficiency in supply. 
I think the government had other motivations as well. Economic develop- 
ment was considered extremely important, and there was a criterion of equity. 
Service was needed to all parts of  the United States at a reasonable cost as 
we underwent western expansion. Over time, however, economic development 
goals were largely satisfied. Services were universally available and at reason- 
able prices. There was also technological change that was lowering cost and 
bringing new modes of transportation  and communications  into being. Increas- 
ingly, rules that were designed for railroads were extended inappropriately to 
more competitive modes, like air and truck. The government started to main- 
tain equity, not just for rural consumers, but between modes of transportation 
and between different carriers and players within industries. Regulations be- 
came even more cumbersome, and scholars began to discover and to highlight 
regulatory failures as being worse than the market failures that regulation was 
meant to address. Hearings in aviation in the early 1970s were the most dra- 
matic example of  bringing these regulatory failures to public attention (see 
Breyer 1982). 
The Kennedy hearings dramatized the fact that the CAB was holding air 
fares at a high level that prevented many ordinary citizens from using them. 
Citizens were offered much lower prices in  states, such as California and 
Texas, that had decontrolled  interstate prices. It was demonstrated  that the mar- 
ket worked much better for consumers than did regulation. 
So the attitude that favored regulation began to change. The imperfections 448  Elizabeth Bailey 
of competition were deemed to be preferable to the imperfections of  regula- 
tion. The new decontrol policy has been codified in a modem, more refined 
version of  workable competition, known  as contestability theory  or  con- 
testability-enhancing principles (see Baumol, Panzer, and Willig 1982; and 
Bailey 1991).' These principles dictate removing regulatory and antitrust bani- 
ers that prevent the access of competition or that prevent competitive pricing 
or contracting. They include making an effort to free markets that can be com- 
petitive. Similarly, they include examining markets to see whether potential 
competition is workable before actual share of market is taken to be a sign of 
monopoly power. 
Even when sunk costs are significant, traditional rate and entry regulation 
may not be necessary: where possible, government should intervene to ensure 
equal access to the sunk facility. If the facility is privately owned, government 
should require equal access by all users at equal prices. If the facility is owned 
by  a public authority, then that authority should have open access among its 
users. If  it is not possible to ensure equal access, sunk investments should be 
isolated. That portion of  the industry should continue to be regulated. Even 
here, however, a form of regulation should be adopted that permits as much 
freedom of contracting and other operating flexibility as possible. 
These prescriptions are displayed to a remarkable degree in the U.S.  decon- 
trol movement of the 1970s and early 1980s. They provide a unifying theme 
for otherwise quite diverse industry situations. 
In aviation, open entry into city-pair routes was seen as providing multiple 
competing airlines in most traffic markets. The threat of potential competitors 
was thought to offer an acceptable constraint on monopoly pricing in thin traf- 
fic markets. Thus, the Airline Deregulation Act of  1978 opened entry fully in 
all markets. One year later, full upward pricing freedom was to be conferred. 
The industry thought to be the most contestable  was thus the most fully deregu- 
lated. 
In railroads, the 1976 Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act 
(the 4R Act) offered price freedom when shippers had competitive alternatives 
from competing railroads or more broadly from trucks and barges. Regulation 
was continued in situations, such as coal transport, where a particular railroad 
holds a position of market dominance. So that was a very appropriate way, from 
the contestability stance, of sorting out what needed to be done in that industry. 
In telecommunications, technological change meant that competition was 
now possible in long-distance services. Contestability theory would say that 
these markets should be deregulated. The Department of  Justice (DOJ) rea- 
soned that, for this deregulation to succeed, it was necessary to divest AT&T 
of its local exchange services. Then AT&T would be unable to use its geo- 
1,  The philosophy that competition is the preferred policy as long as the free market can achieve 
a level of performance at least as high as can be enjoyed under government regulation or ownership 
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graphical control at the local exchange level to thwart competition in long- 
distance markets. The divested local exchange companies were deemed not to 
be competitive given today’s technology. So price regulation was continued for 
local exchange services. Equipment manufacturing is competitive structurally 
and therefore was opened for the most part to competitive forces. So the broad 
framework of divestiture was consistent with the theory. 
In  gas  transport,  the  Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission  (FERC) 
opened competition by changing the rules of supply. Now distributors and end- 
use customers can purchase gas directly in the field in competition with one 
another and with pipelines. Pipelines are constrained to transport this gas at 
nondiscriminatory rates. So the logic of decontrol is evident here as well. 
In the electric utility industry, beginning efforts are being made to recognize 
that the generation layer of the industry has the potential for competitiveness. 
Thus, there has been some deregulation of wholesale bulk power sales. The 
distribution function, where sunk costs are still substantial, continues to be reg- 
ulated. 
Therefore, despite the variety of different interest groups, from legislators 
to bureaucrats to academicians to executives, who were involved in policy set- 
ting for these industries in 1970s and 1980s, I believe that there was implicit 
consensus on the central ideas that guided the control movement. 
It is as though the same energies were tapped into by  the various protago- 
nists in this period. The shared flow of thought had coalesced during the pre- 
ceding decades of regulatory oversight. The switch from the focus on market 
failure was necessitated by the dynamics of competitors trying to gain access 
to markets. Economists, regulators, and antitrust administrators became used 
to dialogues in which parties actively spent more and more of  their time not 
thinking about natural monopoly but instead thinking about why entry should 
be permitted in markets that previously had been shielded from entry. A new 
entrant desiring to participate in long-distance telecommunications services 
would force one expert witness into developing the idea that such services were 
no longer natural monopolies. A responding witness would develop a test to 
show that a low price response to competitive entry was acceptable since it did 
not place an unwarranted burden on the consumers of the firm’s  monopoly ser- 
vices. 
And so was forged, by a process of conflict, a framework of consensus. 
The transition to the freer environment has been dynamic and turbulent. 
Certain groups have gained, such as customers in dense markets. Other groups 
have both gained and lost, such as customers in thin markets where service has 
improved but price has risen. Other groups have lost, such as organized labor, 
whose pay  is declining to competitive levels. So there has been controversy. 
There has also been further evolution in decontrol policy as some of the perfor- 
mance results have been analyzed and understood. Some degree of experimen- 
tation continues to take place. 
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concepts in dealing with continued regulation of captive markets, such as coal 
transport to public utilities. These ideas have been most efficacious for they 
offer the protection of regulation in setting overall price ceilings while encour- 
aging freedom of contracting. Most of the coal movements now operate not 
under the regulatory tariffs but instead under very sophisticated contracts that 
set a number of conditions on investment and performance as well as price. 
These ideas could beneficially be spread to other deregulatory settings, espe- 
cially telecommunications  and gas pipelines. 
In telecommunications, decontrol policy could be made much more bold. 
Because of the price distortions of state regulation, the prices of long-distance 
services have been held way above costs in order that prices of local, particu- 
larly rural, services can be low. This structure has encouraged massive entry 
and investment in duplicative switches and fiber optic cable during the decon- 
trol period. While costly, there is the benefit that full deregulation of long- 
distance services could now be justified, and this may happen soon. So, even 
though AT&T still has a very big market share, several other firms now have 
the potential to serve the entire market. Similarly, total deregulation of tele- 
phone equipment is warranted, including lifting the restriction that prevents 
local operating companies from entering this business. 
In airlines, it is now recognized that the industry is imperfectly contestable. 
Fortress hubs and computer reservations systems have sunk  cost characteris- 
tics. Hubs, involving a whole system of routes that need simultaneously to be 
offered, constitute an  entry barrier and hence afford geographic rents to carri- 
ers. In addition, few carriers now have the resources to construct and deploy 
computer reservations systems. Competition is working reasonably well, but 
there is a balance between quite low prices in competitive city-pair markets 
and higher prices on monopoly routes and at concentrated airports. The DOJ 
realizes that both hubs and reservations systems have brought service benefits 
to consumers even as they have reinforced the oligopolistic characteristics of 
the industry. Rather than reregulate, however, DOJ intervention is being under- 
taken on a case-by-case basis to keep the degree of  these rents reasonable. 
Other important issues in aviation are the need to find airport polices that ad- 
dress airport congestion issues now and for the future and the need for policies 
that preserve an adequate number of competitors in the industry. 
Perhaps the industry most in need of systematic applicatioh of  contesta- 
bility-enhancing decontrol policies is the electric utility industry. Just as rail- 
road rates of return were set too low by regulators in past decades, so today 
state regulators are allowing electric utilities rates that are insufficient to fi- 
nance new plant construction, both in terms of transmission facilities and gen- 
eration. Moreover, in both electric and gas utilities, partial deregulation has 
introduced price distortions that encourage uneconomic bypass. For example, 
private firms are finding it cheaper to construct billions of  dollars of  direct 
pipelines rather than pay the high cross-subsidy prices set for common carrier 
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To conclude, I will say that I am confident that deregulation is the right 
policy for the long run,  but I know that it continues to present difficulties  today. 
However, I do not believe that we are going to backslide, as Bill Niskanen is 
concerned. Full economic regulation just does not make sense at a time when 
the pressures for market economies are manifesting themselves throughout the 
world. Indeed, I think that the momentum from US.  decontrol policies is re- 
sponsible in no small measure for the move toward privatization and market 
economies in other countries. So the United States must continue to evolve 
policies that spiral in the direction of economic freedom, adopting a philoso- 
phy of minimalistic interventions. 
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Summary of Discussion 
Paul Joskow believed that people may underrate the actions of  the Reagan 
administration regarding economic regulation. Joskow thought that  this is 
partly because the administration had a very tough act to follow. In the late 
1970s, there was both administrative deregulation and significant statutory 
changes, while there were fewer statutory changes in the 1980s. 
Joskow argued, however, that the administration had prevented the regula- 
tory situation from worsening in the 1980s, which had been a real threat. The 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), for example, went beyond what the 
Carter administration had been willing to do. This was especially true in the 
case of railroads, where the ICC interpreted the law in such a way as to prevent 
the captive shippers from capturing the regulatory process again. Joskow 
wished that there had been a sunset provision for the ICC, like that for the 
Civil Aeronautics Board, but going through Congress to obtain that provision 
might have had greater costs than benefits. 
The appointment of Mark Fowler to the Federal Communications  Commis- 452  Summary of Discussion 
sion was also a good decision, according to Joskow. Fowler dealt very effec- 
tively with congressional concerns about changes in the telecommunications 
system after 1984, and, despite criticism, he maintained the system of adding 
access charges to local telephone bills. 
Finally, with regard to natural gas, no one wanted to raise the issue of natural 
gas policy in the early 1980s, given what had happened in 1978. By 1983, it 
was probably not worth spending a lot of  political capital in order to revise 
regulations that were scheduled to expire in 1985 anyway. By 1986, when the 
oil and gas markets collapsed, the regulations were no longer binding. Overall, 
Joskow felt that a fair appraisal of economic regulatory policy in the 1980s is 
between a B + and an A-  . 
Robert Litan argued that there is tremendous latent demand on the part of 
the public for reregulation of prices whenever the price of  a particular com- 
modity begins to soar. Examples at the state level include attempts to regulate 
the prices of insurance and cable television. At the federal level, the move for 
reregulation of airlines is partly due to the high prices in St. Louis and Minne- 
apolis and also partly due to a concern for safety and a widespread feeling that 
deregulation caused the whole mess. It is interesting, Litan added, that this 
demand for reregulation has not applied to oil prices. One reason may be that 
the Reagan administration dismantled oil price controls right at the begin- 
ning-the  United States has not had controls on oil prices for ten years. The 
other reason is that most people remember the long lines in 1973-74 and asso- 
ciate them with the price controls. This may be one case in which latent de- 
mand for reregulation will not arise precisely because people draw the connec- 
tion between price regulation and its adverse effects. 
David Stockman asserted that the Reagan administration believed that eco- 
nomic regulation was wrong as a matter of first principles. He said that, if 
one looked at the economy in 1979, perhaps $400-$500  billion of GNP was 
regulated: oil, gas, trucking, railroads, even airlines were just coming out of 
regulation. Now all that regulation is gone, and there is very little likelihood 
that the political system could build it back up again-there  are too many 
players who benefit from an open market. Thus, Stockman believed that the 
battle of first principles had been won and further, had diffused throughout the 
entire world. Deregulation was not only a domestic success but also a global 
victory that will have huge consequences for a long time to come. 